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Nearly every project in the Architecture, Engineering, and Construction (AEC) 
industry has at least one stakeholder who perceives a benefit from an early start to 
construction. As a result, project teams face pressure to begin construction, whether or 
not they are in fact ready. In order to begin early mobilization, engineering design 
drawings are then rushed and assumptions left unmitigated, resulting in inaccurate plans 
and, often, unrealistic schedules. The construction phase of the project is then impeded by 
costly interruptions and holds. When these interruptions occur, project teams often react 
by spending more money and crashing schedules even further in order to make up for the 
interruptions, causing additional strain on all project stakeholders.  
This research sets out to investigate premature starts to construction and to 
document drivers, leading indicators, and impacts that can occur as a result. To prevent 
these impacts and interruptions, the Construction Industry Institute (CII) commissioned 
Research Team (RT) 323 to gain a better understanding of what constitutes a premature 
 vii 
start to construction and what factors drive a premature start. The main objective of RT 
323 was to first define what a premature start is, determine what drives a premature start, 
understand what impacts occur as a result, and lastly, to investigate if there are any 
leading indicators, or red flags, that could serve as early warning signs that the 
construction phase of a project is mobilizing prematurely. Two research thrusts were 
carried out in order to develop both a qualitative and quantitative understanding of 
premature starts to construction. The secondary objective was to utilize this knowledge to 
develop a tool, known as the Premature Start Impact Analysis (PSIA), which can be used 
in the industry to prevent premature starts to construction. RT 323 envisions that such a 
tool will be incorporated into project risk assessment and overall planning, and will 
facilitate communication between stakeholders.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Construction Industry Institute (CII) Research Team (RT) 323 was charted to 
investigate premature starts to construction and to document drivers, leading indicators, 
and impacts that can occur as a result. Early efforts of RT 323 involved defining what 
constitutes a premature start to construction. In order to develop a basis of analysis, RT 
323 defined a premature start as a decision, by at least one party, to start construction 
with at least one risk that exceeds an acceptable tolerance to a party and which can result 
in an interruption to construction. 
With this definition, RT 323 hypothesized that various impacts occur as a direct 
result of a premature start. Furthermore, RT 323 postulated that there existed drivers that 
influence a premature start and leading indicators that could signal a premature start. This 
motivated the team to determine to what extent is the commonality of these drivers and 
leading indicators, and how severe are the impacts. RT 323 proposed that having this 
information prior to mobilization could warn a project team that the construction phase is 
beginning too soon and construction interruptions and negative outcomes are likely to 
occur. 
Even though there are numerous planning tools and templates, projects still 
experience costly stops or holds. Moreover, since at least one stakeholder on virtually 
every project benefits from a premature start to construction, project teams nearly always 
feel pressure to begin construction—whether or not they are in fact ready. When a project 
starts construction prematurely, the result is frequently that it experiences an interruption 
to construction at least once. Complicating matters, when projects experience these stops 
and starts, project teams often seem to react rather than take a proactive management 
approach.  
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Research in this area is dated and generally more focused on project readiness, 
effects of field rework, project change management, cost/schedule controls than on actual 
investigation of premature starts. The focus throughout past research has been to improve 
pre-project planning techniques and enhance coordination between stakeholders in order 
to prevent these various impacts (Laufer 1991; Gibson and Dumont 1995; Walewski, 
Gibson and Dudley 2003). However, very little research exists that investigates drivers 
and impacts of premature starts to construction and what are early warning signs. New 
research is needed to better document premature starts and their impacts. This 
information could then be used to alert project stakeholders at all levels of an 
organization. It was with this need in mind that the Construction Industry Institute (CII) 
commissioned Research Team (RT) 323. First, a review of past literature was carried out 
to understand what has been discussed regarding construction interruptions and what the 
outcomes are followed by two research thrusts explained in section 1.2 of this chapter.  
1.1. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of the research was to identify and document drivers and impacts of 
premature starts to construction to establish whether there are leading indicators to signal 
a premature start to avoid unintended construction interruptions. The objectives of this 
research involve the following: (1) identify leading indicators that signal a potential 
premature start, and (2) document drivers and impacts of premature starts to construction. 
Contents of deliverables will cover the following areas: 
1. Identify leading indicators associated with premature starts. 
2. Describe the drivers and impacts of premature starts. 
After performing these stages of research, RT 323 developed a Microsoft Excel-
based tool called the Premature Start Impact Analysis (PSIA) that incorporates the 
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research findings into an interactive tool that can be used in the industry by various team 
members throughout the project lifecycle. The primary purpose of the PSIA is to identify 
potential impacts based on leading indicators and drivers related to premature starts. The 
tool then guides the user towards reference material and data validation compiled by RT 
323, such as case studies and additional survey data. This information is presented in the 
PSIA in conjunction with the anticipated impacts in order to alert the user of the 
quantified impact data discovered by RT 323. The development process of the PSIA and 
deployment recommendations are described in detail in Implementation Resource 323-2. 
The outcome of this research will guide CII members and others involved on construction 
projects to an improved understanding of the drivers, impacts, and leading indicators of 
premature starts that can be used to improve project delivery. 
1.2. RESEARCH SCOPE 
The primary scope of this research involved reviewing past literature as well as 
conducting survey and case study based research. Review of literature served as a basis 
for how the research questions were developed and initial drivers, leading indicators and 
impacts were identified. Because RT 323 was composed of members involved with a 
wide range of project definitions, the primary research focus was on project types within 
the expertise of the research team. Industry sector expertise ranges from heavy industrial 
to governmental agencies and is made up of both owners and contractors. Given that 
industrial construction projects are usually complex and involve several stakeholders, 
project management teams deal with a high degree of uncertainty and risk. Therefore, RT 
323 focused primarily on industrial construction projects. The scope was limited to the 
impacts incurred during the construction phase of a project due to a premature start, 
drivers and leading indicators prior to the premature start. 
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Two research thrusts were carried out in order to develop both a qualitative and 
quantitative understanding of premature starts to construction. The first research thrust 
focused on defining and documenting drivers and leading indicators associated with 
premature starts. This thrust aimed at identifying any leading indicators that could signal 
a premature start to help prevent construction interruptions. Impact data collected from 
case studies was compared to the baseline scope, schedule, and cost of that particular 
project. Research scope of the case studies looked at impacts incurred during the 
construction phase of a project due to a premature start. The second research thrust 
focused on quantifying discoveries made in research thrust one by conducting a survey. 
The team chose to analyze drivers, impacts, and leading indicators in terms of 
commonality, or the frequency of an occurrence on a construction project. Construction 
impacts related to premature starts were observed in terms of commonality and severity. 
Survey results were then partitioned by owner and contractor to determine whether or not 
premature start perceptions differed from one project entity to another.  
The main focus area of the research approach is limited to drivers, impacts, and 
leading indicators. The primary goal of documenting drivers and impacts was to 
quantitatively and qualitatively describe the types and impacts of premature starts 
illustrated via in-depth case studies. Identification of leading indicators was also limited 
to case studies and literature review but was extended through internal team validation. 
The leading indicators were identified through case studies and literature, as described in 
the Research Methodology section. Special efforts were taken to ensure that the case 
studies were readable and accessible to a broad industry audience. 
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1.3. RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters that cover every aspect of the research 
done by RT 323. Chapter 2 describes the research methodology and explains the research 
structuring process and data collection approach. Chapter 3 will review past academic 
journals and scholarly articles that served as points of departure for crafting the research 
questions and for identifying gaps in knowledge. Chapter 4 contains in-depth case studies 
conducted by RT 323. Each case contains a description of the project and how the project 
outcome fits the definition of a premature start to construction and its pertinence to RT 
323. After reviewing each case study, the research team began defining and categorizing 
key terminology. These terms and definitions are found in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 includes 
the research findings discovered by RT 323. Chapter 7 introduces the Premature Start 
Impact Analysis (PSIA) tool, and discusses how it can be used in industry as a means of 
detecting a premature start to construction. This chapter will discuss the tool development 
process, features, example applications and deployment recommendations of the PSIA. 
Chapter 8 will be a collective review of the lessons learned by RT 323 throughout the 
research project. The ninth and final chapter concludes this research report by reviewing 
the initial research objective and discussing how the research approach and results fit that 
objective.    
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The research implemented by RT 323 consisted of review of existing literature, 
in-depth case study analysis, and survey-based research. Prior to executing the data 
collection phase of this project, RT 323 reviewed several research papers and looked 
within the make-up of RT 323 to extract as much information as possible. The essential 
question addressed by this research was: “What are the leading indicators to signal a 
premature start to avoid unintended construction interruptions?” In order to answer this 
question, RT 323 proposed two intermediate questions that explore the underlying cause 
and effect of premature starts to construction. These two questions were:  
1. What are the factors that drive a premature start to the construction phase?  
2. What are the types and impacts of interruptions related to premature starts? 
Throughout the research phase of this project, the research team chose to leverage 
as much information from past research and from within the collective expertise of RT 
323 participating members. Figure 1 outlines the research process take by RT 323.  
 
Figure 1: Diagram of Research Process 
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To answer these questions, the research approach was broken down into two 
separate thrusts in order to develop both a qualitative and quantitative understanding of 
premature starts to construction. The qualitative thrust includes pilot case studies, in-
depth case studies, interviews of professionals on the project, and documentation of 
lessons learned. The quantitative thrust involved a survey of industry professions in 
various AEC disciplines.  
2.1. EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
This section includes a detailed description of existing knowledge reviewed for 
this research report. Because of the diverse nature of the research team, RT 323 derived 
much of its knowledge base from members within the team; some of whom have over 
twenty years of construction industry experience. This section will provide an overview 
of collective team expertise and also describe the process of reviewing past studies and 
journal articles.  
2.1.1. Collective Team Expertise 
RT 323 members came from various industry sectors with project definitions 
ranging from the oil and gas industry to historical site renovations. The team held several 
brainstorming sessions prior to conducting surveys and case studies in order to develop 
comprehensive criteria for classifying a premature start. Many RT 323 members already 
had a risk register of potential leading indicators and drivers from their organizations, 
which helped inspire the categorical framework utilized by this research project. The 
team also included individuals from organizations heavily involved with software and 
graphical user interface development. Team members with this background helped design 
a straightforward working environment for the PSIA so that the user experience can be as 
seamless and as data rich as possible. 
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2.1.2. Literature Review 
The literature review served as a point of departure for how the research question 
was developed and what the study should focus on. Due to the limited research 
discussion surrounding premature starts to construction, broad research topics such as 
front end planning, effects of rework, risk assessment, and work packaging were 
investigated. To serve as a means of analyzing a premature start in terms of what drives it 
and what are some early warning signs, RT 323 searched for past studies that focused on 
documenting and surveying multiple factors related to a certain outcome in order to serve 
as a means of measuring current project status. 
2.2. DATA ACQUISITION 
The research team determined that two research thrusts would be needed in order 
to develop a qualitative and quantitative understanding of premature starts to 
construction. The first research thrust focused on identifying drivers and leading 
indicators associated with premature starts. This thrust aimed at identifying if there were 
any leading indicators that could signal a premature start to help manage/prevent these 
construction interruptions, through case studies, related data, and literature review. 
Leading indicators can help communicate to major project stakeholders the severity of 
the potential outcome of a premature start to a project, illustrated through documented 
cases. The primary research strategy of thrust one was case study research. The research 
team followed a two-step analysis for the case studies. First was intra-case analysis which 
focused on a description of a single project with a documented premature start, impacts, 
drivers, and potential leading indicators. Second was cross-case analysis, which consisted 
of a section cut of common information across all cases to identify commonalities and 
patterns in drivers, impacts and leading indicators. For each case, the research team 
identified key drivers that led to the premature start, the main interruption, and the 
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impacts of that interruption to construction. The ultimate objective was to find leading 
indicators through understanding drivers – moving from post-mortem analysis to 
proactive/leading indicator identification.  
2.2.1. Qualitative Research Approach 
The first research thrust focused on identifying drivers and leading indicators 
associated with premature starts through case study based research. The purpose of 
research thrust one was to gain a qualitative understanding of premature starts to 
construction by implementing a research strategy known as “theory building case 
studies” (de Vaus 2001). This strategy involves first hypothesizing about a certain 
outcome and selecting cases that further develop the proposition. De Vaus explains that 
“(i)n the theory building model, we begin with only a question and perhaps a basic 
proposition, look at real cases and end up with a more specific theory or set of 
propositions as a result of examining actual cases”. According to de Vaus, “analysis of 
each case would aim to highlight differences between cases where it did and did not 
work” (de Vaus 2001). This type of analysis would also involve looking at commonalities 
of each case and formulating various propositions. It is with this that RT 323 chose to 
pursue a qualitative approach to researching premature starts by theory building case 
studies.  
To accomplish this, research thrust one involved pilot case study submissions 
from past projects completed by member of RT 323 that faced construction interruption. 
After each pilot case study satisfied the definition of a premature start to construction, 
select pilot cases studies were expanded upon as in-depth case studies. The following 
sections will describe in detail the process taken to develop a well-defined and qualitative 
understanding of premature starts to construction.  
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Pilot Case Studies 
Case studies were completed in a three step process. First, a pilot case study was 
submitted and reviewed by the research team in order to determine if the case was in fact 
a premature start. Members of RT 323 received a questionnaire asking about basic project 
information and what were some interruptions and impacts faced by the project team. 
Each case study underwent a vetting process to see if the pilot case study was in fact a 
premature start according to the definition derived by RT323. In order to qualify a project 
as a premature start, the project had to: (1) have faced at least one instance where the 
construction phase was interrupted, and (2) have a risk tolerance for a single party 
exceeds acceptability prior to mobilization. If the pilot case study satisfied those two 
items, it would move on to become and in-depth case study. 
In-Depth Case Studies 
If a pilot case study was deemed in fact a premature start, an interview with a 
project member (project manager, project engineer, or supervisor) was conducted with a 
member of project team to collect detailed information such as company profile, project 
overview, cost and schedule information. The last step was to develop a write-up 
describing what were the drivers of the premature start, what leading indicators or red 
flags were available to the project team during construction, what impacts occurred as a 
result, and what were the lessons learned. Information gathered from the case studies 
were logged into a table and reviewed by the research team to determine commonality 
amongst completed case studies. 
2.2.2. Quantitative Research Approach 
The second research thrust aimed at documenting the impacts of premature starts 
to construction and quantifying the commonality of these documented drivers and leading 
 11 
indicators, as well as commonality and severity of impacts. This thrust aimed at 
describing the types and impacts of premature starts, illustrated through survey data. The 
research team collected data through a survey, administered to both CII member 
companies (through RT 323 direct contacts), as well as the Construction Users 
Roundtable (CURT) membership during the 2015 CURT National Conference. The 
objective was to support a quantitative description of the impacts of premature starts to 
construction.  
Survey 
The survey consisted of eight questions. The first two questions were intended to 
classify the respondents into owners and contractors with a breakdown of industry sector. 
The purpose of this was to see if there was any difference in perception of the data 
between groups. The next four questions employed a 5-point Likert scale. The research 
team produced four versions of the survey to minimize the effect of recency and primacy 
bias. Recency and primacy bias refers to a survey respondent’s recollection dependence 
on the order of list items (Knoedler et al., 1999). The respondents’ memory of earlier test 
items is best while recollection of middle and later list items worsens. Randomization of 
survey list items across multiple survey samples reduces the bias over the entirety of the 
survey results. The next four questions in the survey addressed drivers, leading indicators 
(red flags), commonality of impacts, and severity of impacts. The final two questions of 
the survey covered the respondent’s most recent project experience in terms of cost and 
schedule growth, and captured approximate project value for their most recent project 
relevant to this topic. The research team also asked for those who would be willing to 
participate in a follow up interview. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1. OVERVIEW 
Review of literature served as a point of departure for how the research questions 
were developed, and how drivers, leading indicators and impacts were identified. Due to 
the limited research surrounding premature starts to construction, broad research topics 
such as front end planning, effects of rework, risk assessment, and work packaging were 
investigated.  
3.2. STUDIES ON PROJECT DRIVERS 
A speedy time-to-market with minimal field rework clearly has extensive business 
value. Although this may be true, construction delays in the industry continue to plague 
the global construction market and are becoming a typical characteristic of the 
construction project lifecycle (Sambasivan and Soon 2007; Sweis et al. 2008). To 
understand these current industry challenges, one paper investigated factors that extend a 
project lifecycle and the frequency of each (Zidane et al. 2015). What the research 
uncovered was that the top five causes of delay, referred to as “time-thieves”, are 
“management and coordination”, “quality issues and errors”, “administration and 
bureaucracy”, “decision issues” and “waiting”. It was noted that some of these factors 
were more important to owners rather than contractors. Survey results indicated that the 
“(t)he two first were important to all parties, of the three others were more important for 
contractors and subcontractors less to the clients and sponsors”. Indication, or a red flag 
warning system, of the potential factors for occurrence prior to them actually becoming 
problematic was not extensively researched in the study. 
When an organization experiences an interruption, project teams react by 
spending additional capital on increased labor and speedier engineering documentation 
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delivery in order to get the project back on tract. This behavior often times has an adverse 
effect and creates confusion, low quality drawings, and additional interruptions. One 
study investigating complex industrial projects claims that they are subject to unique 
types of risk (Li, Taylor, Ford 2011). The article claims “(o)ne such risk is the 
combination of rework and increased project scope that can push a project from a 
behavior mode of progress towards completion, past a tipping point, and into a behavior 
mode of falling further and further behind”. A tipping point was considered to be a 
threshold condition that, when crossed, internally threatens the success of a project 
(Sterman 2000). The goal of the study was to determine a method of monitoring those 
tipping points by understanding their dynamics. Understanding of tipping point 
characteristics would then allow project teams to handle issues with a proactive approach 
rather than being surprised and forced to react. The study created models and simulated 
various project situations. An example of what Sterman (2000) discovered was that 
certain well intended project control actions, such as overtime, pushed the project over 
the tipping point and into various problems. A sensitivity analysis was done to understand 
the extent of the negative project impact. Although this study covered actions taken 
during the construction phase of a project, the research did not evaluate actions made 
prior to construction mobilization. 
According to a study investigating cost-influencing factors on construction 
projects, cost overruns are a common problem in the construction industry (Cheng 2013). 
The study claims that it is customary in the construction industry for contracts to bid low 
in order to win the job, therefor, without controlling certain cost-influencing factors of 
the project, construction companies will not be able to effectively control cost 
expenditures. The purpose of the study was to investigate what those cost-influencing are 
and how they could be monitored and controlled throughout the construction lifecycle of 
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a project. The study concluded that there were sixteen factors that showed a significant 
degree of influence over project costs. These sixteen factors are shown in Table 1 along 
with their severity index and rank.  
Table 1: Ranking of the key cost-influencing factors (Cheng 2013). 
Factor SI (severity 
index) 
Rank 
Clearly define the scope of project in the contract 94.78 1 
Cost control 94.78 1 
Contract dispute (unclear drawings or guidelines/regulations 93.04 2 
High fluctuation in commodity 89.57 3 
The gap between the construction plan and the reality is too great 89.57 3 
Material shortage or supply delay 89.57 3 
Time management 88.7 4 
Practical experience 87.83 5 
Modifications to the scope of construction 86.96 6 
The level of demand on quality 86.96 6 
Project team (coordination capability and the understanding of operational 
procedure) 
86.96 6 
Project valuation does not match the collected payment 86.09 7 
Procurement contract 85.22 8 
Geology, topography 84.35 9 
Climate factor 82.61 10 
Natural disaster 80 11 
These factors were determined through surveys using the Kawakita Jiro (KJ) 
method and the Modified Delphi method (MDM) with two groups and two rounds of data 
collection. The paper argues that “(i)f construction companies can effectively control 
these key factors and formulate prevention strategies, it is possible not only to avoid cost 
overrun(s), but also to increase the overall profits for the project”. Impacts outside of 
cost-overruns were not looked at in this study. Although cost overruns are a chronic 
 15 
problem across most projects in the construction industry (Doloi 2011), there are a 
multitude of impacts other than cost overruns that need to be evaluated.  
Another study investigated the implementation of various innovative and non-
traditional practices and determined ten drivers that play a role in determining the use of 
these practices within an organization (Vanegas et al. 1998). The purpose of this study 
was to analyze the practices of reducing engineering cost and capital cost, and still 
achieve business objectives. The main objectives were to evaluate different techniques, 
identify innovative or non-traditional practices, and define the drivers that determine the 
use of these practices. The report contains 10 of the practices, and explains what are the 
benefits and risks for the company by adopting them.  
Another research project utilizing the driver-impact research framework is CII RT 
300 that addressed the impact of late deliverables to a construction project (Barry and 
Leite 2014; Barry and Leite 2015; Barry et al. 2015). The process of determining the 
impact of late deliverables began with developing a comprehensive list of indicators 
through expert interviews, in-depth case studies and industry surveys. These studies set 
the framework in which RT 323 would ultimately use to investigate drivers and leading 
indicators that signal a premature start. RT 300 also developed a tool called the Late 
Deliverables Risk Catalog (LDRC) designed to allow users to check late deliverables 
such as “engineering equipment” or “external permits”. The tool then takes these inputs 
and returns potential project impacts while also directing the user towards case studies 
that supports the output.  The tool utilizes a tree-like structure with collapsible categories 
that allows a user to track specific details that pertain to the project being evaluated. The 
LDRC was developed mainly for use by industrial sector construction projects. The intent 
of the LDRC was not to mitigate problems caused by late deliverables but instead help 
project teams identify potential issues prior to their occurrence (Barry and Leite 2014).  
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3.3. STUDIES ON NEGATIVE PROJECT OUTCOMES 
Early inspiration of investigating drivers, leading indicators and impacts to 
premature starts to construction as a means of predicting project success or failure was 
found in a study by CII RT 153, whose objectives were to determine major causes of 
rework, how to efficiently categorize and record factors, determine impacts on cost and 
schedule, and identify practices to minimize the occurrence of rework (Rogge et al. 
2001). RT 153 created a list (shown in Table 2) of potential predictors of field rework 
using past projects as a benchmark and then conducted a survey to quantify and evaluate 
the relationship of each predictor. What they discovered was that certain predictors had a 
stronger influence to field rework than others.  
Table 2: Field Rework Causes and Relationships (Rogge et al. 2001). 














Owner alignment 2 1 0.19 .00 
Design rework 31 15 0.16 .00 
Constructability commitment 33 16 0.16 .00 
Interdisciplinary design 
coordination 
23 10 0.13 .00 
Degree of project execution 
planning 
8 4 0.12 .00 
Design firm’s qualifications 13 7 0.08 .00 
Field verification 20 9 0.08 .00 
Expected craft worker 
availability 
38 17 0.08 .00 
Expected construction 
overtime 
39 18 0.07 .00 
Engineering overtime 30 14 0.06 .00 
Design leadership changes 19 8 0.05 .01 
Design schedule compression 29 13 0.04 .01 
Vendor prequalification 26 11 0.03 .02 
Vendor information 28 12 0.03 .02 
 17 
What the results from RT 153 indicate was that relationships between the various 
items in the left column of Table 2 can be linked to negative construction outcomes; in 
this case, field rework. This provided a starting platform for RT 323 to begin looking for 
similarly influencing factors that could contribute to negative construction impacts that 
are not necessary limited to rework. RT 323 chose to expand the scope and include 
negative outcomes such as schedule delays and cost overruns. 
Delay and disruption claims continue to be an area of uncertainty and a potential 
area for dispute in the construction process (Critchlow et al. 2005). It is without doubt 
that researching potential causes of construction interruptions and developing methods of 
interruption avoidance can improve project team awareness and provide a proactive 
management approach to eliminating disputes, litigation and claims. According to one 
study that looks at delay and disruption claim avoidance, “(d)isruption costs are 
essentially production related and, as such, are difficult to prove” (Aibinu 2009). What 
the research suggests is that delay claims often stem from the construction phase of a 
project and, as a result, are difficult to investigate because a contractor has limited means 
of proving owner-driven delay that has negatively impacted construction-worker output 
(Aibinu 2009). One cause of delays was identified as owner directed changes (Aibinu 
2009). Owner directed changes were discovered to be potential “delay events that could 
give rise to extension of time claims” because they disrupt the contractor’s work pace 
leading to overall schedule slippage.  
Owner directed change can also negatively impact labor productivity. According 
to Ibbs (1994), change is defined as any addition, deletion, or revision to the general 
scope of a contract (1994). Ibbs (2012) argues that when additions or deletions in scope 
of work occur, the result is typically rework, schedule resequencing, schedule delay, and 
possibly schedule suspension; each of which impact labor productivity (Ibbs 2012).  With 
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this it becomes clear that change to project scope should be minimized. One study in 
dispute avoidance and mitigation looks at project benchmarking of a contractors 
performance (LaBarre and El-adaway 2013). The research looked at various reasons for 
claims in construction including safety issues, design errors, changes, and delay. The 
study went on to survey 40 construction contractors who did work for the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers regarding various performance measures. The result of the research 
was a benchmarking model that could provide contractors a means of mitigating 
problems and issues that would have otherwise caused litigation and claims (LaBarre and 
El-adaway 2013). The research was limited strictly to contractor performance and did not 
review actions by project owners or other stakeholders.  
According to another study, rework has become one of the most common 
concerns on construction projects (Hwang, Zhao, Goh 2014). This research focused 
mainly on client-related rework and found that rework occurs due to changes, defects, 
and omissions. The research concluded that the client, rather than the contractor, 
contributed most to rework. One recommendation from the study suggests that 
developing a risk-register or knowledge transfer system of specific measures could 
support the decision-making process to control the occurrence of rework. The scope this 
research was also limited to projects based in Singapore.  
Walewski et al. (2003) suggest that there are various risk factors that influence 
construction cost and schedule performance from project conception to completion 
(Walewski, Gibson and Dudley 2003). Some of these factors are inherent to organizations 
that are solely responsible for managing them, whereas others are closely related to the 
political, cultural, economic, and operational environments of the project’s location. With 
this, it becomes clear that the search for factors that influence a projects outcome are not 
limited to owner driven schedules, but also factors such as time to market, seasonal and 
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weather constraints, and financial obligations.  
Regarding time to market, one study researched time to market as a project driver 
and looked at associated implications (Mahmound-Jouini, Midlerm and Garel 2004). The 
goal of the study was to understand management of time on Engineer-Procure-Construct 
(EPC) projects from a time-to-delivery perspective. What the research found was that 
concurrent engineering reduces time to market and has the potential to speed-up projects. 
Mahmound-Jouini et al. (2004) warned however, that “(o)ne might think that in order to 
reduce the delay of the project decisions must be made as quickly as possible.” 
Additionally, “at the beginning of the project, understanding is too low a level and it 
serves no purpose to make hasty decisions”.  The paper states that “there is a risk of 
getting off on the wrong track, possibly resulting in costly and time-consuming 
modifications” (Mahmound-Jouini, Midlerm and Garel 2004). The decision to mobilize 
field craft and heavy equipment and begin construction is a single decision that arguably 
has the most financial and legal implication of the entire project. The extent of those risks 
and what could be some indicators of those risks occurring was not looked at in the study. 
3.4. STUDIES ON NEGATIVE PROJECT OUTCOME AVOIDANCE AND PRACTICES 
Through reviewing past literature, RT 323 discovered many studies that 
researched and developed some form of risk assessment or conflict avoidance tool that 
can be applied to any project of carrying scope. These include items such as the Project 
Definition Risk Assessment (PDRI), the Late Deliverables Risk Catalog (LDRC), the 
International Project Risk Assessment (IPRA), and the Flash Track tool (Gibson and 
Dumont 1995; Barry et al. 2015; Walewski, Gibson, and Dudley 2003; Austin, de la 
Garza, Pishdad-Bozorgi 2015). These tools were developed by incorporating findings 
from research that targeted specific aspects within the construction industry such as 
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stakeholder alignment, front-end planning, and constructability. This section will review 
each of these industry practices and tools to gain a better understanding of what negative 
project outcome avoidance techniques already exist and what knowledge gaps could be 
closed. 
The PDRI was developed by the CII Front End Planning Research Team 113 and 
the Project Definition Rating Index (PDRI) for Industrial Projects Research Team 153 
(Gibson and Dumont 1995; Gibson 1997). The Front End Planning Research Team was 
commissioned to develop project tools that support both owners and contractors during 
the pre-project planning stages of a construction project. The PDRI is an Excel-based tool 
that serves as a checklist and allows users, typically all stakeholders on a given project, to 
rate various project category elements. Research Team 113 also researched and defined 
standardized construction terminology to incorporate into the PDRI in order to better 
facilitate communication between all project stakeholders.  
The categories and elements in the PDRI cover a broad range of pre-project items 
such as “Equipment Scope”, “Site Information” and “Business Objectives” (Gibson and 
Dumont 1995). The user of this tool is asked to score 70 weighted elements. A low score 
for a category indicates the item is well defined while a high score indicates the item is 
poorly defined. The total score of a project is out of 1000 points. The research showed 
that successful projects scored less than 200 (Gibson and Dumont 1995). It is 
recommended that scores for each element are to be determined by a group of project 
team members with a neutral facilitator to lead the scoring process (Gibson and Dumont 
1995).  
One valuable feature of the PDRI is that each element is weighted according to 
relative importance based on industry perception. During the research phase of 
developing the PDRI, two workshops, involving 54 project managers and estimators from 
 21 
the construction industry, were held so that each element could be weighted (Gibson and 
Dumont 1995). These weighted elements then underwent a validation process which 
involved surveying company representatives on 23 projects. The purpose of this was to 
correlate PDRI scores with actual project success. Each company representative was 
asked to refer back to the pre-design and pre-construction phase and determine how well 
each element from the PDRI was defined at that time. The research team then developed 
a method to determine project success based the relationship between pre-project 
planning efforts and project success (Gibson and Dumont 1997). What was discovered 
was a positive correlation   between low PDRI scores and high project success.  
During the development and validation of the PDRI, the research team found that 
project team members and stakeholders often had conflicting criteria for determining 
project success (Gibson and Dumont 1997). One of the biggest discoveries made by 
developing the PDRI was not simply being able to give a project a score out of 1000, but 
also allowing all project teams to understand and effectively communicate to all parties 
the overall project objective (Gibson and Dumont 1995). This prompted the need for an 
additional research team to investigate factors that affect project team alignment and how 
it impacts project success (Gibson and Dumont 1997).  
In an effort to establish standardized industry terminology, the Front End 
Planning Research Team originally defined alignment as “the condition where 
appropriate project participants are working within acceptable tolerances to develop and 
meet a uniformly defined and understood set of project objectives” (Gibson and Dumont 
1997). Under the guidance of the Front End Planning Research, CII published a follow-
up research report called “Team Alignment During Pre-Project Planning of Capital 
Facilities” (Griffith and Gibson 1997). Using workshops, surveys and telephone 
interviews, a list of 66 issues involving project team alignment were discovered. These 
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issues fell into separate categories such as “execution process” issues, “tools”, 
“information”, and “company culture” (Griffith and Gibson 1997). From the list of 66 
issues, 10 were deemed critical based on survey rankings and actual project data. The top 
three critical alignment issues are “proper staffing of pre-project planning team with 
representatives from all significant project stakeholders”, “develop and support effective 
team leadership”, and “identify and communicate to all pre-project team members the 
priorities between the project’s costs, schedule, and required features” (Griffith and 
Gibson 1997). Using sample projects, the research team utilized the project success index 
versus PDRI score developed by the Front End Planning research team and did a 
regression analysis with 20 sample projects in order to understand if there was a 
correlation between a PDRI score, alignment, and project success. The research 
uncovered a positive relationship between alignment and project success. What this 
allowed project teams to do is measure the degree of alignment attained on projects prior 
to design and construction (Gibson and Dumont 1997). One limitation was mentioned in 
the study and that is that the sample projects that were used to validate the alignment 
versus project success were all large industrial projects.  
Another study reviewed is on the topic of Constructability. CII initiated a 
taskforce to determine which constructability practices are being used in the construction 
industry and to qualitatively describe its benefits through documented cases. 
Constructability refers to the “optimum use of construction knowledge and experience in 
planning, design, procurement, and field operations to achieve overall project objectives” 
(O’Connor and Tatum 1986). The objective of the taskforce was to determine how 
constructability is currently applied based on past project characteristics. The second part 
of the investigation looked at how constructability concepts apply to both design and 
construction phases of a project. The goal was to then lump these characteristics into a 
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program that can be implemented to allow for constructability concepts to be applied to 
any given project. To determine these key aspects of constructability, seven projects were 
reviewed and constructability characteristics that apply to both construction and design 
were recorded. 
Through cross-case analysis, the task force determined that four common 
characteristics were emphasized by projects who utilize a constructability program. The 
number one characteristic is that “(o)wner and contractor (design and construction) 
managers are committed to the cost effectiveness of the whole project. They recognize 
the high cost influence of early project decisions” (O’Connor and Tatum 1986). Another 
common characteristic is that designers are receptive to input from construction teams 
and often times request feedback and evaluate recommendations objectively. The 
research team summarized all of these characteristics and compiled key ingredients 
required for a successful constructability program. This included clear communication of 
constructability commitment, encourage teamwork, assign a single point-person to lead 
the program, and start constructability as soon as possible (O’Connor and Tatum 1986).  
Another research project that produced a tool is CII Research Team 311 that 
looked at fast track projects in order to determine what industry practices are essential to 
attain an even faster successful project delivery, known as “flash track project” (Austin, 
de la Garza, Pishdad-Bozorgi 2015). The research team, recognizing the emergence and 
prevalence of flash track construction projects, looked at how these projects could be 
delivered efficiently by developing a complete understanding of every aspect of flash 
track projects and creating a tool that obtains inputs regarding organizational capacity and 
contract selection to planning and execution.  
The research first identified flash track practices by reviewing literature and 
interviewing personnel on EPC flash track projects (Austin, de la Garza, Pishdad-Bozorgi 
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2015).  From the research, 66 practices were identified and later ranked using Analytical 
Hierarchy Process. The ranks of each practice was determined by recruiting 64 individual 
industry experts who had to meet minimum criteria in order to participate. This included 
a minimum of fifteen years of experience in the EPC or AEC industry, five years in a 
project leadership role, five years fast track project experience, and prior experience in at 
least two phases of a project’s life cycle (Austin, de la Garza, Pishdad-Bozorgi 2015). RT 
311 then incorporated the results into an Excel-based tool that helps users assess the 
readiness of the project team prior to beginning a flash track project. The tool also 
recommends strategies based on the users input to increase the likelihood of successful 
project delivery.  
The final research study reviewed that developed a research implementation tool 
is from the CII Risk Management Integration Team (RT 181). The goal of the team was 
to review and integrate risk management documentation into a tool called the Integrated 
Project Risk Assessment (IPRA) (Walewski, Gibson, and Dudley 2003). The 
development of this tool is based heavily on the same process utilized by the Front End 
Planning Research Team that developed the PDRI. The main difference is that the PDRI 
is meant to be used during the pre-planning stages of a project lifecycle while the IPRA is 
designed to be used during all stages of a project lifecycle. Expert interviews from 26 
upper mid- to upper-level management personnel were conducted from 26 organizations 
made up of contractors and owners (Walewski, Gibson, and Dudley 2003).  
Focus groups were then implemented during the research process to weight each 
element. These expert interviews resulted in 82 risk elements grouped into 14 categories 
representing the entire project life cycle from business plan evaluation to production and 
operation. The IPRA also differs from the PDRI in that the user of the IPRA must include 
a two-step input per element process rather than issuing a single value for each item. This 
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two-step process requests that the user provide a “likelihood” and “impact” score of each 
risk element. To serve as a validation process, RT 181 conducted workshops with 
industry professionals who used the IPRA in conjunction with past projects to see if 
project success was correlated. The research stated that one limitation to the study is that 
these projects were volunteered and could be biased towards successful projects while not 
fully incorporating unsuccessful projects in the validation process. The time taken to 
complete the IPRA with test subjects was one to four hours.  
3.5. DISCUSSION 
These studies inspired RT 323 to structure the research in a driver-leading 
indicator framework. Because of the implication of incomplete engineering 
documentation and abundance of field rework as a result, RT 323 chose to look at 
engineering documentation as a potential leading indicator to signal a premature start. 
After reviewing multiple sources, it became evident that drivers affect a project outcome 
and contain one or more indicators that take place prior to the influencing factor. 
Throughout the literature review, it became a main goal of RT 323 to determine exactly 
what those leading indicators are, how they are defined within the context of the 
construction industry, as well as how they can be quantified. RT 323 also chose to 
develop a tool that incorporates the research findings into a user-friendly excel-based 
environment. The goal was to also allow users to have quick and easy access to survey 
data, case studies, and terminology developed by RT 323. This was chosen as an 
objective so that projects teams can gain awareness and avoidance of beginning 
construction prematurely.  
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Chapter 4: Case Studies 
This section contains each in-depth case study. The case studies vary in project 
scope, schedule, and budget. Project definition for these case studies include projects 
related to infrastructure development, government funded renovations, and oil and gas 
midstream facilities. Average baseline project cost for these case studies range from $2.4 
million to $208 million (average: $64.2 million; median: $44.2 million). These results 
from research thrust one serve as the framework for the creating the survey conducted in 
the quantitative research thrust. 
The case study research also served as an opportunity for the research team to 
collect terminology from each scenario and to compare it to other scenarios of similar 
outcomes. First the team identified key components that qualified the case as a premature 
start to construction and categorized and defined each. This approach helped further 
qualify each aspect of a premature start to construction. Definitions of each category can 
be found in Chapter 5. 
Two rounds of pilot case study place. Each pilot case study answered eight basic 
question regarding project scope, cost, schedule, and interruption(s) that took place on the 
project. Twenty pilot case studies were collected from the two rounds of submissions. 
These pilot case studies were the starting point for the in-depth case studies. given that 
they satisfied the definition of a premature start. After performing the first several in-
depth case studies, the team planned subsequent in-depth case studies. Of the twenty pilot 
case studies, eight became in-depth case studies. For research thrust one, the team 
followed a two-step case study analysis process as follows: 
 Intra-case analysis: description of a single project with a documented premature 
start, impacts, drivers, potential leading indicators; 
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 Cross-case analysis: section cut of common information across all cases to 
identify commonalities and patterns in drivers, impacts and leading indicators. 
For each case, RT 323 identified key drivers that led to the premature start, the 
main interruption, and the impacts of that interruption to construction. See Table 3 for a 
list of pilot and in-depth case studies. 
Table 3: Pilot Case Study Summary 
 
The twenty pilot case studies reflect the diversity of the construction projects and 
include cases with varying levels of project definition. Each case also 
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identifies with various industry sectors, such as oil and gas to government renovation 
project. The pilot case studies that fit the definition of a premature start to construction 
are highlighted in grey in Table 3 and list basic project attributes. These in-depth case 
studies are found below in the following sub-sections. 
4.1. CASE STUDY 1: COST AND SCHEDULE DRIVEN PREMATURE START 
This case study investigates the effects of having a government grant issued on 
the basis of the completion of certain construction milestones and how it drove the 
construction of a renewable energy plant. It will look at how time to market and an 
aggressive owner schedule also influenced a premature start to construction and discuss 
various impacts of that premature start in the project outcome. Table 4 identifies 
(asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which premature start drivers, leading 
indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
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Table 4: Case Study 1 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
Owner Perceived Benefit For Early 
Start 
*Late Design Deliverables *Overtime / Unplanned Work  
*Time to Market Unrealistic Schedule *Schedule Slippage 
Seasonal / Weather Constraints Material Not Available *Out of Sequence Work 
*Regulatory Compliance 
*Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
*Rework 
*Capital Availability Unmitigated Assumptions Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started Unclear Project Objectives 
*Facility Start-up / Production 
Delay  
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License / Permits Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order to 
Start Billing 
Unsupportive Management 
Relationship / Reputational 
Damage 
 
Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
*Poor Morale 
  *Safety Exposure  
  Litigation / Claims 
  
*Failure to Attract / Maintain 
Craft 
Company Profile 
The company involved in this case is a design-build contracting company 
specializing in the design and construction of industrial facilities such as power plants, 
oil, gas and chemical facilities, and other manufacturing facilities. The project 
investigated in this case study is a renewable energy power plant located in the 
northeastern region of the United States. 
Project Overview 
The project delivery type was Design/Build with a contract type of lump sum. 
Funding for this project was supplemented by an American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) government grant which was to be awarded to the contractor upon the 
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completion of specified construction milestones. The first milestone that needed to be 
achieved in order to qualify for the grant was the installation of a specified percentage of 
building foundations. After the end of the fiscal year, the grant money would have 
expired and would no longer be available to the contractor. Thus, a sense of urgency was 
placed on completing the grant milestones which led to interruptions to the construction 
phase of this project. In order to achieve this milestone, the equipment foundation design 
process was accelerated and since the detailed equipment data sheets from the project 
vendors were not yet available, conservative assumptions were made for equipment 
loading. As a result, the foundation design was ultimately completed with less 
information than is typical or ideal and led to many construction interruptions, involving 
both the contractor and the subcontractor.  
Table 5: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Power 
Project Type Renewable Energy Power Plant 
Construction Location New England, US 
Contract Type Lump Sum 
Baseline Project Cost (TIC) $208 million 
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $240 million 
Total Project Baseline Duration 24 months 
Total Project Actual Duration 27 months 
The premature start risk identified in this project was the acceleration of the 
design process and subsequent start of construction for the equipment foundations. This 
task is considered a risk because detailed equipment data sheets necessary for 
comprehensive foundation designs were not yet available from the equipment vendors 
when the foundation design started. The decision to start construction, despite the 
aforementioned risk, was driven primarily by a government grant which was to be issued 
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to the contractor upon the completion of certain construction milestones.   
Driver(s) 
Throughout the course of this project two main drivers were identified; one being 
the grant tied to certain construction milestones and other being the time to market push 
by the contractor and owner, who both were owners in the power plant. As described 
earlier in this case study each of these drivers caused interruptions in the construction 
phase. The second driver identified in the project is directly related to time to market. 
Being a co-investor in the project, the contractor shared risk with the owner in the sense 
that they both perceived a benefit with an early start-up so that revenues from power 
generation could commence as soon as possible. Because the contractor shared partial 
stake in the operation of the plant, a larger emphasis was placed on getting the plant 
producing power which required an aggressive schedule. In summary, the drivers 
identified in this case were: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Time to Market 
 Regulatory Compliance 
 Capital Availability 
Impact(s) 
One impact of the accelerated foundation design process that caused interruptions 
in the construction phase was fluctuations in manpower for the concrete subcontractor. 
As soon as a foundation design for a piece of equipment was released for construction, 
the foundation contractor increased manpower and completed the work. Once that 
foundation was installed, the contractor reduced manpower and waited for the next set of 
foundation drawings to be released.  These fluctuations in manpower had significant cost 
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impacts as well as trade labor frustration, as steady work was not available. Key 
personnel on the subcontractor team were lost due to the start/stop nature of the 
foundation installation.  
Another interruption to construction as a result of the accelerated foundation 
designs was added rework. More than typical amounts of rework were reported as being 
required as a result of the early and accelerated foundation designs. Excessive rework 
increased worker safety exposure due to overtime and shift work in order to meet 
milestones. Stacked resources also contributed to increased dangerous work zones. More 
than typical amounts of rework, poor productivity, and an overly conservative concrete 
design affected the overall quality of the project. Cost and schedule outcomes include not 
being able to competitively negotiate price because of growing pressure to start 
construction; total installed cost (TIC) was $240 million ($32 million more than the 
contract cost). Also, although all construction milestones were met, overall construction 
did not meet production date. The impacts of these interruptions are summarized below.  
 Cost Overruns 
 Out of Sequence Work 
 Overtime/Unplanned Work 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Scope Not Identified 
 Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
 Relationship/Reputational Damage 
 Poor Morale 
 Litigation/Claims 
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 Safety Exposure 
 Failure to Attract/Maintain Craft 
Leading Indicator(s) 
Leading indicators act as early warning sign that have potential to alert the project 
team of potential problems and issues. This section will cover warning signs that were 
pointed out by members of the project team that could have provided some foresight that 
construction interruptions were imminent. Signing and closing of the contract occurred 
three months later than expected; contributing to major deliverables arriving late. Another 
key indicator was lack of vendor information and procurement schedule prior to 
commencing design. As a result, engineering documents were not complete and lacked 
detail. Foundation engineers were not sure where tie-in-points were going to be; as a 
result, assumptions were made. When vendor information was available and assumptions 
were deemed incorrect, rework of pipe installation had to occur. Leading indicators 
identified on this project include the following: 
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
 Late Design Deliverables 
 Vendor Information Unavailable Prior to Design 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
 Importance of Schedule Integration between Engineering, Procurement & 
Construction: In order to prevent the ramp up / ramp down of manpower for the 
concrete installation contractor, the Engineer-Procure-Construct (EPC) Contractor 
could have taken a step back to regroup. The EPC team could have put together 
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an execution schedule that grouped portions of the foundations into design 
packages (e.g. 50% of the foundations). That design package could then be 
released for construction and allowed the Civil Contractor to work steadily. The 
second design package could have been released at the time the first set of 
foundations was completed to allow additional steady, uninterrupted work for the 
Civil Contractor. This could have potentially reduced costs, improved morale, and 
maintained a predictable overall project schedule. 
 Conduct a detailed risk analysis on front end costs vs. potential benefits: In 
this project, the completion of the commercial agreement occurred three months 
after the date that it was originally planned. However, the end date of the project 
did not change. In retrospect, the EPC Contractor and Owner could have jointly 
moved forward with detailed design during the time period that the commercial 
agreement was in negotiation. The risk (and associated sunk costs) of moving 
forward with the detailed design was much lower than then risk (and associated 
sunk costs) of compressing the EPC schedule for the overall project. The team 
could have conducted a risk analysis at this point in the project and have 
potentially saved the project from cost and schedule impacts. 
 Front end evaluation of available resources and their allocation to the 
project: During FEED, the EPC team could have performed a more detailed 
analysis of available resources and the plan for allocation of those resources to the 
project. For this project, there were resource shortages that were not discovered 
until those shortages were impacting cost and schedule. 
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4.2. CASE STUDY 2: OWNER DRIVEN CONSTRUCTION THROUGH OVERLY 
AGGRESSIVE SCHEDULE 
This case study investigates the effects of having an owner mandated aggressive 
schedule and how it drove the construction of a $55 million dollar chemical plant. It will 
also look at how an owner’s perceived benefit for early start-up influenced a premature 
start to construction and discuss various impacts of that premature start in the project 
outcome. Table 6 identifies (asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which 
premature start drivers, leading indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
Table 6: Case Study 2 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
*Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start 
*Late Design Deliverables *Overtime / Unplanned Work 
Time to Market *Unrealistic Schedule *Schedule Slippage 
Seasonal / Weather Constraints *Material Not Available *Out of Sequence Work 
Regulatory Compliance 
*Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
*Rework 
Capital Availability Unmitigated Assumptions *Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started Unclear Project Objectives 
*Facility Start-up / Production 
Delay  
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License / Permits *Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order to 
Start Billing 
*Unsupportive Management 
*Relationship / Reputational 
Damage 
 
Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
Poor Morale 
  *Safety Exposure  
  Litigation / Claims 
  






The company responsible for construction on this project is a large Engineering-
Design-Construction (EPC) Contractor located in North America. The Contractor has 
extensive experience in oil and gas, infrastructure, power, and industrial markets and is 
one of the largest providers of engineering, construction, and technical services in the 
world. 
Project Overview 
This case study looks at a brownfield project belonging to the heavy industrial 
subsector. The project delivery type was EP-C where the Owner was responsible for the 
engineering and procurement while the Construction Contractor was responsible only for 
the construction. The contract type was cost reimbursable. This Construction Contractor 
had no prior business relationship with this particular client and was currently facing an 
aggressive Owner mandated schedule to complete construction by July 2013. After 
accepting the terms of the contract the contracting company mobilized for construction. 
The Construction Contractor then encountered several issues with engineering design, 
fabrication and equipment, and material delivery. Significant design errors became 
prevalent and materials were arriving out of sequence and contained deficiencies. An 
overall critical path in the schedule could not be determined by the Construction 
Contractor and many of the Owner mandated construction sequences were considered 
disruptive and contradictory to typical flow of construction.   
The status of engineering and procurement was unclear before the contract was 
awarded to the Construction Contractor; however, it was assumed to be sufficient per 
Owner information. During construction, the Owner did not provide items such as 
materials purchasing order information to the Construction Contractor. The Construction 
Contractor did not know when materials and equipment would be arriving to the 
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construction site for installation. Initially, the Construction Contractor maintained a low 
level of craft to align with available engineering and procurement information. Because 
of the lack of material and equipment delivery information from the Owner, the 
Construction Contractor did an independent review of engineering and procurement 
phases to better understand what was needed to continue construction. After these 
reviews were conducted and several design and fabrication errors became apparent, it 
became clear to the Construction Contractor that there were scope definition issues and 
additional resources would be required in order to meet the Owner’s completion date of 
July 2013. Several schedule revisions including additional craft resources and double 
shifting were provided to the client by the Construction Contractor that ultimately set a 
projected completion date of December 2013, well beyond the intended completion date 
desired by the Owner. The Owner did not accept the December completion forecast and 
directed the new completion date to be in September 2013. Table 7 summarizes the 
various cost and schedule implications due to the aggressive schedule and project team 
reacting address the heavy burden of meeting the Owner’s scope requirements. 
Table 7: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Industrial 
Project Type Chemical Company 
Construction Location USA 
Contract Type Cost Reimbursable 
Baseline Project Cost (TIC) $55 million 
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $135 million 
Total Project Baseline Duration 10 months 





The premature start of this project was driven primarily by the Owner in their 
inability to provide the Construction Contractor with a viable construction schedule as 
well as adequate information to accomplish it within a reasonable time frame. 
Information such as engineering and procurement purchase order documentation would 
have allowed the construction team to know what and when certain material and 
equipment would be arriving on the construction site. As a result this led to many 
interruptions during the construction phase of this project. Another major driver of the 
premature start of this project was the lack of constructability planning prior to award of 
the construction contract. For example, the Construction Contractor was never involved 
in any constructability planning. Subsequently, the construction team was not included in 
any constructability reviews and no input from the construction team went into the 
determination of the initial project schedule. Since the Owner was eager to begin 
construction, limited resources were placed on establishing a clear procurement schedule 
which should have been significantly complete so that construction could proceed 
unimpeded in order to meet the original completion date. In summary, the drivers 
identified in this case were: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Owner Perceived Benefit For Early Start  
Impact(s) 
Over the lifecycle of the project there were over 450 change orders that increased 
the baseline project cost from $55 million to $135 million. The majority of changes were 
due to additional scope and engineering, design and fabrication errors. Construction of 
the chemical plant was completed in early 2014; five months after the Owner imposed 
September 2013 deadline and seven months after the original July 2013 deadline. The 
 39 
impacts of these interruptions are summarized below.  
 Cost Overruns 
 Out of Sequence Work 
 Overtime/Unplanned Work 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Scope Not Identified 
 Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
 Relationship/Reputational Damage 
 Safety Exposure 
Leading Indicators 
A leading indicator that signified the premature start to construction was the 
initial contract structure being an EP-C, where the Construction Contractor was 
responsible solely for construction and not engineering and procurement. This structure 
differed from the ideal situation where the Construction Contractor had supportive Owner 
management and heavy involvement in constructability reviews during the engineering 
and procurement phase of the project. Another leading indicator, possible as a result of 
the aforementioned one, was design deliverables arriving late. This could have warned 
the design team that construction material would be delayed or incorrect upon arrival and 
cost overruns and schedule delays would likely be a result. Leading indicators identified 
on this project include the following: 
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
 Late Design Deliverables 
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 Unrealistic Schedule 
 Material Not Available 
 Vendor Information Unavailable Prior to Design 
 Unsupportive Management 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
 Establish an integrated team and assess joint capability to meet project 
requirements: The parties had never worked together prior to the project and 
therefore didn’t understand their respective capabilities, strengths and 
weaknesses. In order to ensure alignment, the Owner, Engineering and 
Procurement contractor (EP) and Construction Contractor (C) should have 
established a stronger relationship via meetings and information exchange, and 
clarified expectations for each party. This could have resulted in an integrated 
team and schedule best suited to the construction requirements. 
 Fully validate constructability program and path of construction in relation 
to schedule and clearly document changes immediately after contract award: 
The Owner and EP contractor didn’t invite Construction into the planning 
meetings or design conversations and it was later discovered that those parties did 
not have construction experience in large capital projects. During the first weeks 
of the contract, the Construction Contractor reviewed the schedule and found it 
lacked industry practices for a large construction project and failed to assert 
strongly enough the need to accept the level of change to the project design and 
schedule. On future projects the Construction Contractor should clearly document 
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the change requirements and gain Owner acceptance on changes as early as 
possible after contract award. 
 Provide Construction contractor access to procurement documentation: The 
Owner was responsible for procurement of engineered items but wasn’t willing to 
share details on purchases due to confidentiality policies regarding vendors and 
cost values. As a result, the Construction Contractor wasn’t provided any data 
regarding delivery schedules, bill of materials, and wasn’t able to prepare 
receiving and resources for installation. On future projects, the Construction 
Contractor should include access to purchasing data in the contract, or arranged to 
have some modified versions of the documents to protect confidentiality of the 
Owner and suppliers. 
 Approval of rework/scope change should include approval of schedule 
impact: Owner acknowledged the scope changes but rejected the revised 
construction schedule. In future projects, the Construction Contractor can 
emphasize the schedule impact on change requests to retain a trail of 
communication and protect integrity of the Owner-Contractor business 
relationship. 
4.3. CASE STUDY 3: LIMITED CAPITAL AVAILABILITY AND UNMITIGATED 
ASSUMPTIONS 
This case study investigates the effects of making unmitigated assumptions prior 
to construction and how it led to significant cost overruns and schedule delays of a plant 
renovation project. It will also look at how limited capital availability influenced the 
project team to make these assumptions, causing a premature start to construction. Table 
8 identifies (asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which premature start drivers, 
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leading indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
Table 8: Case Study 3 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
Owner Perceived Benefit For Early 
Start 
Late Design Deliverables *Overtime / Unplanned Work  
*Time to Market Unrealistic Schedule *Schedule Slippage 
Seasonal / Weather Constraints Material Not Available Out of Sequence Work 
*Regulatory Compliance 
Vendor Information Unavailable Prior 
to Design 
Rework 
*Capital Availability *Unmitigated Assumptions Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started *Unclear Project Objectives 
*Facility Start-up / Production 
Delay  
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
*Lack of Regulatory License / Permits *Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order to 
Start Billing 
Unsupportive Management 
Relationship / Reputational 
Damage 
 
Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
Poor Morale 
  Safety Exposure  
  Litigation / Claims 
  
Failure to Attract / Maintain 
Craft 
Company Profile 
The Owner Company on this project is a large multinational heavy industrial 
company specializing in steel manufacturing. The project reviewed in this case study 
belongs to the heavy industrial integrated steel manufacturing sector and is located in 
eastern Canada. 
Project Overview 
The project scope was to replace two deteriorating crude liquor tanks (north and 
south) with a much larger tank previously used to store fuel oil as part of another process. 
This tank was no longer in service. The tanks to be replaced were used in the coke 
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making byproduct process for temporary and surge storage of crude liquor. The project 
scope included three major parts: (1) the refurbishing of the five million gallon tank, (2) 
engineering and construction of new and refurbished piping and plumbing, pumps, and 
all control systems necessary to transport the byproduct into the repurposed five million 
gallon storage tank, and (3) the process engineering associated with polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbon control according to environmental requirements. Additional piping and 
distribution systems were required to integrate the repurposed tank into the liquor 
processing system. Original overall project duration was twelve months with a budget of 
$2.4 million. The contract type for the new construction of pipes and systems controls 
was lump sum. Table 9 and Table 10 provide additional details regarding cost and 
schedule. Having passed inspection five years prior, the repurposed tank was assumed to 
be in working order and that no repairs would be required. This could not be validated 
pre-approval, however, as the tank was still partially full and validation would require 
additional funds for pumping and disposal. The project was approved based on this scope 
definition and assumption. 
The project was approved on October 2011 with a planned startup in October 
2012; a total baseline project duration of twelve months. The project was identified as 
being schedule driven; an aggressive schedule was composed in order to have the 
refurbished tank available during a scheduled maintenance outage, as well as to meet 
certain discharge restrictions mandated by a governmental environment protection 
organization. The Owner was enthusiastic to consume available capital funds from the 
site allocation before year end. As a result of these drivers, process engineering was not 
completed prior to project approval and it was assumed that the condition of the tank was 
satisfactory for reuse. 
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Table 9: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Industrial Manufacturing 
Project Type New construction and modification 
Construction Location (Extremely) Brownfield 
Contract Type varies (lump sum and reimbursable) 
Baseline Project Cost (TIC) $2,400,000  
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $4,360,000  
Baseline Contract Cost $1,900,000 
Actual Contract Cost $3,159,000  
Total Project Baseline Duration 12 months 
Total Project Actual Duration 18 months 
Construction Baseline Duration 5 months 
Construction Actual Duration 8 months 
During process engineering, a refining process design was identified which would 
allow improved environmental performance, which was a secondary project driver. The 
initial plan to replace both liquor storage tanks was revised to maintain the use of the 
north crude liquor tank as a buffer and employing the five million gallon tank as a 
secondary settling tank. The additional settling would reduce liquor impurities prior to 
processing through the bio-plant and subsequent discharge to the municipal waste water 
system. The result was additional project scope, engineering, equipment and installation 
cost. Following completion of process engineering, the quotation for detailed 
(construction) engineering went considerably beyond the project budget estimate. The 
project budget was reforecast and the decision was made to continue into 
implementation. 
As the project moved to the construction phase it was realized by the Owner that 
significant repairs were needed on the five million gallon tank. The process design 
change, as well as the repairs to the five million gallon tank, extended the project 
schedule and increased costs.  Table 10 depicts the baseline scheduled duration versus the 
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actual duration. 






Total Project 12 months 18 months 50% 
Engineering 4 months 10 months 150% 
Construction 5 months 8 months 60% 
Start-up/Commissioning 3 months 5 months 67% 
Driver(s) 
The premature start to this project was driven by three different areas. The first 
driver came from the need to quickly refurbish the tank and get it operational in time for 
the scheduled outage of the plant. The assumption that the five million gallon tank was 
not in need of repairs was incorrect and forced the schedule to be extended and additional 
funds to be spent. The second driver was the government mandate to meet effluent 
discharge requirements within an acceptable timeframe. The third driver was the addition 
of project scope in order to take advantage of available capital funds that would expire 
once the fiscal year ended. Because of these various drivers, the project had begun 
prematurely without having done any process engineering or properly validating 
assumptions. The schedule was extended by nine months and the project cost exceeded 
the original budget by $2.1 million. In summary, the drivers identified in this case were: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Time to Market 
 Regulatory Compliance 




This case faced multiple impacts as described previously and are summarized 
below: 
 Cost Overruns  
 Schedule Slippage  
 Scope Not Identified 
 Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
Leading Indicator(s) 
Expedition of project in order to make use of available capital before the end of 
the fiscal year and incomplete process engineering prior to project approval were both 
noted as key leading indicators of a premature start for this project. Having recognized 
these indicators could have prevented a severely unrealistic schedule from being 
conceived. Also, significant scope changes were approved after potential process 
performance improvements were identified following process engineering. Scope shifted 
accordingly but project objectives were unclear and assumptions were left unmitigated. 
Leading indicators identified on this project include the following: 
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
 Unmitigated Assumptions 
 Unclear Project Objectives 
 Lack of Regulatory License/Permits 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
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 Conflict and priority of drivers lead to misalignment on project objectives: 
The primary drivers of the project were to meet environmental requirements, 
shutdown schedule timelines and consume available capital funds within the 
calendar year. The secondary driver is the tacit expectation that the necessary 
front-end work will be done so that the project is scoped correctly and has a high 
probability to be delivered on schedule and budget. The focus on the primary 
drivers by project stakeholders incentivized the project team to undervalue the 
secondary drivers. The result was incorrect scope with assumption risk and 
development of an underestimated baseline for cost and schedule. The project 
team should have discussed misalignment issues with all stakeholders to ensure 
that consideration is given to the potential risks and impacts and whether time is 
needed to investigate and mitigate risks. 
 Risk assessment is necessary to identify and derive mitigating strategy for 
significant aspects of a project: Reliance on prior inspections lead to 
assumptions about equipment condition and influenced the approach to the 
project. Conducting a risk assessment would have allowed stakeholders to 
understand the potential influence on the project if the assumptions turned out to 
be incorrect. This would allow management to make an informed decision about 
the realistic business case prior to committing to construction. Incomplete process 
engineering and invalidated assumptions regarding existing equipment condition 
resulted in delays to construction and significant cost overruns. 
 It is necessary to have a change management process to assess and 
communicate impacts: Changes to the process engineering late in the project led 
to significant scope changes. The end result was a better performance from an 
environmental discharge point of view. However, the associated schedule delays 
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and cost increases were viewed negatively by senior stakeholders. Adhering to a 
rigorous change management process would have required the project team to 
assess the process engineering change and communicate the impacts to senior 
stakeholders. Communication of the changes would have allowed prioritizing and 
alignment of objectives by stakeholders (i.e. improving performance at the 
expense of cost and time).  
4.4. CASE STUDY 4: TIME TO MARKET FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT 
This case study investigates the effects of having an overly aggressive owner 
schedule and how it forced numerous construction interruptions and impacts. It will also 
look at the effects of multiple parties operating under a contract with unfamiliar 
properties. Table 11 identifies (asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which 
premature start drivers, leading indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
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Table 11: Case Study 4 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
*Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start 
*Late Design Deliverables *Overtime / Unplanned Work  
*Time to Market *Unrealistic Schedule *Schedule Slippage 
Seasonal / Weather Constraints *Material Not Available Out of Sequence Work 
*Regulatory Compliance 
*Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
*Rework 
Capital Availability *Unmitigated Assumptions *Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started Unclear Project Objectives 
*Facility Start-up / Production 
Delay  
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License / Permits *Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order to 
Start Billing 
Unsupportive Management 
*Relationship / Reputational 
Damage 
 
Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
Poor Morale 
  Safety Exposure  
  Litigation / Claims 
  
Failure to Attract / Maintain 
Craft 
Company Profile 
The company in this project is a construction contractor that mainly does 
underground and above ground utility installation for franchise companies and for local 
utilities. The project reviewed in this case study belongs to the infrastructure industry and 
is located in southern United States. 
Project Overview 
The project scope for this case study involved the installation of franchise utility 
underground infrastructure including two hundred thousand linear footage of electrical 
duct bank, one hundred and fifty thousand linear footage of medium voltage cable, thirty 
five thousand linear footage of natural gas distribution, and seventy five thousand linear 
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footage of communication. The utility lines are to feed a large manufacturing/retail site. 
The project is greenfield and underwent construction in 2015. 
The contractor was initially under a lump sum contract with the developer of the 
retail site. On this project, the company providing utility service acted as a joint venture 
operation with the developer of the retail site and would hire the contractor to complete 
all of the duct bank construction as well as installation of all franchise and utility lines. 
This is the first time the contractor had this type of work relationship. The 
Owner/Developer was under obligation to have the retail site operational as well as have 
30 acres of land powered and ready for utility connection. Typically, the contractor 
worked directly for the utility organization rather than a joint venture Owner/Developer. 
Because of this initial contract type, the construction schedule was created by the 
developer and provided to the contractor who had no prior experience working with the 
Owner. Approximately 90 percent of the retail facility had been completed prior to the 
initial bid package so a rush to begin construction was felt by the developer. Accepting 
the contract terms the contractor immediately mobilized and quickly ran into issues and 
interruptions with the initial bid package. 
Table 12: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Infrastructure 
Project Type Utility Infrastructure 
Construction Location Southwest USA 
Contract Type Unit Price 
Baseline Contract Cost $2,380,000  
Actual Contract Cost $3,644,000  
Construction Baseline Duration 12 months 
Construction Actual Duration 21 months 
The initial bid package had inefficient data from the utility company, due to poor 
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communication between the franchise utility engineers and the developer. The developer 
created an overly aggressive schedule which would require the contractor to staff 
additional crews in order to meet the high demands of the developer. To offset these 
additional costs, the contractor included a significant contingency amount in the initial 
lump sum bid to cover the cost and risk of meeting the developer’s goals. During initial 
construction phase, many design issues came about regarding discrepancies between 
Owner-provided drawings and design requirements from the utilities. The project was 
supposed to be completed prior to the facility opening, so there was a schedule-driven 
atmosphere amongst the construction team.   
Driver(s) 
Drivers of this project were determined to be time to market by each of the project 
stakeholders. The Owner/Developer mandated an overly aggressive schedule that 
triggered multiple interruptions, the utility was imposing regulatory compliance on the 
contractor, and the facility soon to open needed power, natural gas, and communication 
lines in order to open to the market. In summary, the drivers identified in this case were: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Owner Perceived Benefit For Early Start 
 Time to Market 
 Regulatory Compliance 
Impact(s) 
The contracting company had never worked with the Owner/Developer and 
Utility incorporating this type of contract. From the beginning, there was poor 
communication and coordination between the utility engineers and with the Owner 
engineers. This often times caused delays in construction, resulting from discrepancies 
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between drawings provided by the Owner and final design requirements from the Utility 
Company. Excessive manpower and equipment were added to meet the Utility’s schedule 
commitment to the Owner to energize the site, causing budget overruns. This case faced 
multiple impacts as described above but can be summarized below. 
 Cost Overruns 
 Overtime/Unplanned Work 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Scope Not Identified 
 Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
 Relationship/Reputational Damage 
Leading Indicators 
Potential leading indicators of a premature start for this project include late design 
deliverables and incomplete documentation such as an incomplete geotechnical report 
and design drawings without approved plans. As a result, excessive contingency was 
added to the initial bid to mitigate the risk from the Owner’s aggressive schedule. The 
Developer assumed engineering drawings from franchise companies would be sufficient 
and provided to contractor. Leading indicators identified on this project include the 
following: 
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
 Late Design Deliverables 
 Unrealistic Schedule 
 Material Not Available 
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 Vendor Information Unavailable Prior to Design 
 Unmitigated Assumptions 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
 Misunderstanding of stakeholder roles and project scope: Owner’s 
engineering and Consulting Firm did not have a clear understanding of what was 
involved to have all Franchise Utilities installed to the project. Multiple Franchise 
companies, (i.e. Natural Gas, Power, Telecom,) were not identified and involved 
in the engineering process even though they were major stakeholders. If proper 
communication and coordination had taken place between all Stakeholders prior 
to sending out request for proposal documents to the contractor scope would be 
clear, designs would be accurate and initial cost budgets would be inline.  
 Engineering firm lacking Subject Matter Experts on Power Line and Utility 
design and construction: Because of the Owner’s engineering and consulting 
firm did not have in house subject matter experts on power line and utility 
construction, the Owner was subject to a large gap in overall scope. This, coupled 
with the demands of contracted opening dates with city officials and investors, the 
Owner was subject to releasing a request for proposal that was incomplete. If the 
engineering consulting firm had originally procured a utility engineering company 
that had a background and knowledge of scope and budgeting costs, a complete 
scope could have been released, and the Owner could have potentially been aware 
of the costs, man power, and capabilities contractors possess to deliver this kind 
of product. 
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4.5. CASE STUDY 5: OVERLY AGGRESSIVE SCHEDULE FOR EARLY TIME TO MARKET 
This case study investigates a project driven largely by time-to-market. This case 
study outlines an extreme case of an owner mandated overly aggressive schedule and 
explains the impacts and interruptions faced by the project design and construction team. 
Table 13 identifies (asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which premature start 
drivers, leading indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
Table 13: Case Study 5 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
*Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start 
Late Design Deliverables Overtime / Unplanned Work  
*Time to Market Unrealistic Schedule *Schedule Slippage 
Seasonal / Weather Constraints Material Not Available Out of Sequence Work 
Regulatory Compliance 
*Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
*Rework 
Capital Availability *Unmitigated Assumptions *Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started *Unclear Project Objectives 
*Facility Start-up / Production 
Delay  
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License / Permits *Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order to 
Start Billing 
*Unsupportive Management 
Relationship / Reputational 
Damage 
 
Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
*Poor Morale 
  Safety Exposure  
  Litigation / Claims 
  
Failure to Attract / Maintain 
Craft 
Company Profile 
This case study will look at an Owner-managed midstream oil and gas project 
located on greenfield site conditions in Southwest United States. The Owner of the 
project is a large independent upstream oil and gas company specializing in drilling and 
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production. The company has various other operations that support fracturing wells but 
their primary function is drilling and production operations.   
Project Overview 
Case study 5 will look at the premature start of construction for a forty acre oil 
and gas midstream plant located in the Southwest United States, purposed to separate and 
treat sour crude oil, natural gas, and water. The gas is sold to a third party and the liquids 
are temporarily stored on site and later transported to market. The new plant to be 
constructed was designed in order to replace an existing plant that was not large enough 
to handle additional development. The new plant was planned to accept flow from a six-
well pad from the north and a three-well pad from the west, with the capacity to 
accommodate future development. The construction of the central gathering point (CGP), 
the point where flow lines from the wells would be directed, would include grading and 
civil work, installation of two five thousand barrels of oil per day (BOPD) heater treaters, 
one fifty million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) amine plant, one fifty MMCFD glycol 
plant, four five thousand barrel storage tanks for oil production, two twenty five thousand 
barrel floating roof tanks for oil transportation, twelve 750 barrel storage tanks for water, 
two compressors and associated mechanical and electrical equipment and piping 
On April 2013, the decision was made to fully develop the area and would include 
approximately ninety wells on twenty well pads, and one CGP. The original budgeted 
amount to complete the project (the CGP) was $39.2 million. The project objective for 
this site will be to separate and treat ten thousand barrels per day of oil and fifty million 
cubic feet per day of gas. 
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Table 14: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Oil and Gas 
Project Type Midstream 
Construction Location Southwest USA 
Contract Type Time and Material 
Baseline Project Cost $32,400,000 
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $41,800,000  
Construction Baseline Duration 8 months 
Construction Actual Duration 9 months 
 
During the early stages of the project there were several issues involving access, 
drilling, completions and facilities construction. The first issue involved access to the 
proposed facility by way of a road whose ownership was under dispute. Because the 
landowners in the development’s area had no mineral rights, they had little incentive to 
work with the company during construction and disputed the use of the road with the 
company. This led to legal discussions between the company and the private landowner 
for the use of the access road. Because all legal aspects prior to mobilization were not 
completely resolved, access and development had been delayed.   
Early on in the project, internal teams within the organization were not 
communicating effectively with one another. Facilities construction engineers took the 
unofficial role of project manager in order to get the project moving. Large group 
meetings then took place in order to determine a working schedule for the purpose of 
building in a sequence as to accommodate the construction of the wells. These meetings, 
led mostly by the facilities engineer, were held so the project team could determine what 
each department needed for construction and also to determine in what sequence these 
items be delivered to them. Several department objectives were conflicting or misaligned 
for the overall success and risk of the development, for example: 
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1. Land department objective to acquire low cost site versus site location and timing. 
2. Drilling/Reservoir/Geoscience department objective to select high productivity 
wells versus effect of changes to others, Facilities, Commodity Sales, etc.   
3. Commodity Sales objective to negotiate best terms versus Facilities executing 
capital before definitive terms due to timing. 
The initial plan was for the northern six wells to be drilled first, while the CGP 
was being constructed, so that the completion of both items would be completed at the 
same time. The drilling of six wells would be ninety days. The plant facility would have 
to be completed before this time in order to begin receiving oil and gas from the six 
newly drilled wells. At one point early on during construction, the team received 
notification from management to redirect attention to the western three well pads instead 
of the northern six in order to speed the productions time to market.  
This sequence shift from drilling the western wells first instead of the northern 
instantly reduced the schedule window by half. This schedule change dramatically 
increased pressure for the facility design and construction team since they now had to 
expedite an already behind schedule construction plan.   
At this point, the facility design and construction for the CGP was significantly 
delayed. The original plan was to have the design for the facility completed by September 
2013, construction starting in October 2013 and to have the facility operational by the 
following April. Due to the lack of resources to complete design in-house, facility design 
did not start until July 2013. At this point, the facility engineer determined that a 
contractor was needed to complete the facility design in order meet the aggressive 




The two main drivers identified on this project were: Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule and Time to Market. The project schedule changed at the start of 
design, moving completion from April 1 to January 1, 2014 in order to begin extracting 
petroleum as soon as possible. During this time, the Engineering Consultant worked on 
design with unclear direction while the Owner procured equipment. The Owner in this 
case perceived a large benefit with early start-up, placing a high level of risk on the 
facility engineer and project team to begin construction. In summary, the drivers 
identified in this case were: 
 Owner mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Owner Perceived Benefit For Early Start 
 Time to Market 
Impact(s) 
The premature start of construction in this case caused many negative impacts that 
had to be dealt with mainly by the Owner. Installation cost, low productivity, leftover 
materials, and abandoned scope are examples of these negative impacts. Abandoned 
scope included certain facilities being constructed but not utilized such as a large 25k 
barrel tanks for oil export pipeline. The impacts of these interruptions are summarized 
below. 
 Cost Overruns 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Scope Not Identified 
 Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
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 Poor Morale 
Leading Indicators 
The schedule cut early on was a clear leading indicator that the schedule became 
too aggressive. An uncertain business plan and unclear project objectives further 
compounded the problem stemming from the aggressive schedule shift. Vendor data was 
not available as well leading to scant and overly conservative assumptions. Another 
leading indicator that the construction phase was beginning prematurely was that the 
execution plan was not ideally drafted. Since the execution plan was haphazardly put 
together, scheduling required guesswork. Leading indicators identified on this project 
include the following: 
 Unsupportive management Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
 Vendor Information Unavailable Prior to Design 
 Unmitigated Assumptions 
 Unclear Project Objectives 
 Unsupportive Management 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
 Establish Initial Project Alignment: When the project was sanctioned, 
objectives were unclear. The Company should have established objectives, 
drivers, and risks before proceeding to take initial steps in the project. This would 
have avoided department objectives conflicting with company objectives.  
 Develop Interface Management Protocol: Lack of interface plans resulted in a 
misunderstanding by each department of potential impacts of change to the 
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departments involved. On this project, large meetings were inefficient for 
information exchange and integrity. Meeting schedule should have been 
established chronologically over a period of time with the relevant parties. An 
interface management protocol should also have been established to facilitate the 
exchange of information and change, i.e. communication accountability matrix, 
change management/approval process.  
4.6. CASE STUDY 6: INCORRECT SCOPE ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING EXCESSIVE 
MANPOWER FLUCTUATIONS AND COST OVERRUNS 
The case study investigates a currently ongoing brownfield construction project 
involving the installation of petro-chemical equipment. This case experiences a multitude 
of drivers causing several interruptions and impacts throughout the construction project. 
The project owner’s aggressive schedule, incorrect scope from the original bid, and 
project managers reacting rather than taking a proactive planning approach were 
identified as key drivers of the premature start, which led to impacts such as cost 
overruns, out of sequence work, and failure to attract and maintain craft labor. Table 15 
identifies (asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which premature start driver, 
leading indicator and impact occurred in this case. 
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Table 15: Case Study 6 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
*Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start 
*Late Design Deliverables *Overtime/Unplanned Work  
*Time to Market *Unrealistic Schedule *Schedule Slippage  
Seasonal/Weather Constraints *Material Not Available *Out of Sequence Work 
Regulatory Compliance 
*Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
*Rework 
Capital Availability *Unmitigated Assumptions *Poor Productivity 
*Contractor Eager to Get Started *Unclear Project Objectives 
*Facility Start-up/Production 
Delay  
*Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License/Permits Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order 





Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
*Poor Morale 
  Safety Exposure  
  Litigation/Claims 
  
*Failure to Attract/Maintain 
Craft 
Company Profile 
The company on this project is a large Engineer-Procure-Construct (EPC) 
contracting company focusing primarily on the design and construction of petrochemical 
transfer and refining facilities. Their worksites can be found in regions throughout the 
United States. The EPC contractor owns technology for a specific process of oil refining 
involving petrochemical furnaces and serves as a primary reason for its involvement in 
this project. 
Project Overview 
Given the technological expertise of the EPC in this area, the Owner Company of 
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an existing petroleum plant hired the EPC contractor to install two brand new furnaces. 
The lump sum contract cost was estimated to be $150 million and project duration of 
nineteen months. Estimates of the total installed cost (TIC) are in excess of $200 million 
dollars and with a schedule delay of seven months. The cause of the seven month delay 
and $50 million cost overrun was attributed to the following drivers. First, the owner, 
recognizing the fact that the EPC contractor has extensive knowledge regarding the 
petrochemical furnace technology, assumed that extensive attention to early design 
details would not be necessary in order to speed the installation process. The EPC 
contractor, having perceived a benefit for early mobilization, assumed this would not be a 
problem and chose to mitigate this with expedited fabrication and construction. 
Table 16: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Oil and Gas 
Project Type Midstream 
Construction Location Southwest USA 
Contract Type Lump Sum 
Baseline Project Cost $150,000,000 
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $200,000,000  
Construction Baseline Duration 19 months 
Construction Actual Duration 26 months 
Prior to construction, engineering drawings and documentation arrived to the 
fabrication facilities late and in some cases incorrect. Due to inaccuracies in these design 
documents, scope material from the initial bid had to be modified and a reduction in 
construction occurred since construction was unable to begin without properly designed 
material. The project manager, growing anxious to begin construction, attempted to 
further expedite fabrication by giving them all design drawings at once. These issues 
placed tremendous strain on fabrication, who was receiving three times their normal 
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workload. With such a short time frame the fabrication team fell behind and, in turn, 
further delayed construction. 
The project team chose to mitigate this issue by implementing a second round of 
manpower reduction. This second round of layoffs proved to be very costly.  The project 
team had to increase wages in order to bring skilled labor onto the jobsite. It was reported 
by a member of the project team that during construction, the company was paying the 
highest wages in the region. Further implications of this issue will be addressed in this 
case study. 
Driver(s)  
The delay of construction can be attributed to each project stakeholder. The 
Owner wanted a working facility quickly and the Contractor wanted to mobilize quickly. 
Construction on this project was determined to have begun prematurely and the cause of 
this was attributed to five separate drivers. It was noted by the case study interviewee that 
the contract schedule negotiations bypassed processes in order to cut corners assuming 
the construction team can make up for the tight project duration. In summary, the drivers 
identified in this case were: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Owner Perceived Benefit for Early Start 
 Time to Market 
 Contractor Eager to Get Started 
 Contractor Perceived Benefit for Early Start 
Impacts(s) 
This project faced unfavorable cost and schedule outcomes including a $50 
million overrun and seven month delay. The aggressive schedule drove an unreasonable 
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approach to construction planning which had major implications in productivity. 
Unpredictable hiring and layoffs affected the reputation of the project with local labor 
and affected the ability to recruit and staff; further compounded after the second round of 
layoffs. The impacts of these interruptions are summarized below. 
 Cost Overruns 
 Out of Sequence Work 
 Overtime/Unplanned Work 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
 Relationship/Reputational Damage 
 Poor Morale 
 Failure to Attract/Maintain Craft 
Leading Indicators  
Leading indicators act as early warning sign that have potential to alert the project 
team of potential problems and issues. This section will cover warning signs that were 
pointed out by members of the project team. The planning process was not seen as 
beneficial. Drawing completion and issue restraints were not recognized early on in the 
project and fabricator delivery ability was not properly evaluated. Material Control and 
issue to fabricators was not properly managed. Below are identified leading indicators 
that could have provided the project an early warning that the project was soon to face a 
variety of impacts. Leading indicators identified on this project include the following: 
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
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 Late Design Deliverables 
 Unrealistic Schedule 
 Material Not Available 
 Vendor Information Unavailable Prior to Design 
 Unmitigated Assumptions 
 Unclear Project Objectives 
 Unsupportive Management 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide solutions that address each issue. 
 Scope definition: Understanding of owner specifications should have been part of 
the execution plan before start of project. The project team intentionally released 
steel documents without design being completed in order to meet schedule 
milestones. Impacts to construction were not completely understood when a 
decision was made by engineering to release the steel drawings before the design 
was complete.  
 Follow All Company Procedures and Regulations: Company procedures were 
not followed. If the team had waited until all stress testing and design were 
completed and understood, many negative project outcomes could have been 
avoided. The team could have waited until intermediate and smaller steel design 
was completed.  
 Premature Mobilization Awareness: Having discipline to recognize early 
mobilization and the actual availability for work fronts must be measurable. 
Having earlier awareness of premature mobilization impacts could have warned 
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the project team of negative project outcomes before the project fell behind 
schedule.  
4.7. CASE STUDY 7: GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY AGGRESSIVE TIME TO MARKET 
SCHEDULE 
This case study investigates a government agency beginning a construction 
project with an aggressive owner schedule for a project site that had very strict 
construction guidelines and with limited site availability. It will also look at how 
improper assumptions and failure to mitigate them led to interruptions in the project 
schedule. Table 17 identifies (asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which 
premature start drivers, leading indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
Table 17: Case Study 7 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
*Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
*Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start 
Late Design Deliverables *Out of Sequence Work 
*Time to Market *Unrealistic Schedule *Overtime/Unplanned Work 
Seasonal/Weather Constraints Material Not Available *Schedule Slippage 
Regulatory Compliance 
Vendor Information Unavailable Prior 
to Design 
*Rework 
*Capital Availability *Unmitigated Assumptions Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started *Unclear Project Objectives *Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License/Permits 
Facility Start-up/Production 
Delay 
Contractor Mobilization in Order 





Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
Poor Morale 
  Litigation/Claims 
  Safety Exposure 
  Failure to Attract/Maintain Craft 
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Company Profile 
This Owner Company on this project is a government entity responsible for 
renovation and maintenance of museums and national historic sites around the United 
States. The project reviewed in this case study involves the restoration of a 19th century 
gallery.  
Project Overview 
The project scope includes the complete renovation and replacement of all major 
building infrastructure systems and improvement of interior conditions within the historic 
site. This also includes preservation of the structure along with providing efficient, safe 
and sustainable building conditions. Additional scope requirements include the complete 
removal of hazardous material from the building. For the Owner, preservation of historic 
context is important just as important as upgrading the facility by including items such as 
Wi-Fi.  
The project delivery method for this project was Design-bid-build. The Owner 
hired a local Contractor and awarded $11.2 million to complete the project scope. The 
entire project budget was not available to the Owner prior to bid, so incremental funding 
would be required as basis of payment for the Contractor. Incremental funding included 
an additional $4.6 million and another installment of $4 million to be awarded to the 
contractor throughout the project lifecycle with a total award package of $19.8 million. 
This amount served as the total amount funded in base contract. 
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Table 18: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Buildings 
Project Type Historic Site Renovation 
Construction Location Brownfield 
Contract Type Design, Bid, Build 
Baseline Project Cost $19,839,700. 
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $27,749,100 
Total Project Baseline Duration 15 months 
Total Project Actual Duration 
18 months 
The Owner had to get the project obligated or else the owner would lose funding 
opportunity for the project. When the project went out to bid, not all life safety 
requirements were included. The Owner decided to proceed and get documents out at 
95% completion even though comments from life safety group had not been properly 
addressed. The plan was to get all life safety requirements addressed throughout the 
construction phase of the project. This assumption that all safety requirements would be 
properly addressed during construction proved to be quite costly and caused several 
interruptions during the construction phase of the project. 
One safety requirement was the removal of hazardous material from the site. The 
Owner, having done a preliminary study of the gallery, knew hazardous material existed 
in the gallery. When the Contractor started construction, more hazardous material in 
different locations was discovered and adjustments had to be made in the project 
schedule. Anticipated amounts of hazardous material were significantly underestimated 
by the Owner and as the Contractor uncovered hazmat, material was removed via change 
order. During hazmat removal, parts of the site had to stop construction and nothing 
could move through the area to support other construction elements. 
A second safety requirement that had to be resolved during construction was the 
structural casing of blast proof windows that had to be installed at the site. A series of 
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testing had to be done by the Owners security office offsite during construction. No 
evidence of testing existed in the original submittal and existing windows had to be 
dismantled prior to design of new windows. What the security office did was design 
windows based on assumptions. What the safety office found during testing was that 
additional steel support needed to be added to the building structure in order for the blast 
proof windows to be effective. The construction team had to open all window casings 
which revealed that a top down redesign of the blast windows. Since the original 
windows were designed based on assumptions all of the steel work that was needed for 
proper structural integrity fell out of the performance package. Every single window had 
certain fabrication requirements due to historic context and all changes had to be 
mitigated during construction. 
Driver(s) 
This project identified with four premature start drivers. The original duration of 
the project was planned to be 15 months as mandated by Owner thus leading to Owner 
Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule being the main driver identified as the cause of 
the premature start. Additionally, the project start was driven also by the fact that capital 
funding needed to be spent prior to end of the fiscal year. This led the Owner to identify 
Capital Availability as another driver to the premature start. Below are all of the drivers 
that identify with this project premature start: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Owner Perceived Benefit of Early Start 
 Time to Market 




Throughout the project the duration had to be modified due to the aggressive 
nature of the schedule. The first schedule extension was due to the Contractor discovering 
more hazardous material on site than what was originally reported by the Owner’s 
preliminary investigation. These unknown conditions revealed 27 days of additional work 
that fell out of the performance package. The second schedule extension of 40 days was 
due to additional work related to the blast proof window installation. Along with these 
schedule extensions and delays were significant cost implications. The impacts of these 
interruptions are summarized below: 
 Cost Overruns 
 Out of Sequence Work 
 Overtime/Unplanned Work 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Scope Not Identified 
Leading Indicators 
Potential leading indicators of a premature start for this project include 
incomplete engineering documentation such as not addressing the life safety requirements 
and assuming they could be mitigated during construction. Leading indicators identified 
on this project include the following: 
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete 
 Unrealistic Schedule 
 Unclear Project Objectives 
 Unmitigated Assumptions 
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Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
 Follow Agency Standard Procedures and Guidelines: Allow sufficient time to 
complete coordination of all project discipline and/or requirements to ensure that 
bid documents are 100% and/or For Construction. In order to meet demands to 
send construction documents out for bidding purpose, certain disciplines were not 
able to complete their review. Documents did not include all necessary 
requirements. Upper Management should have held firm to agencies standard 
procedures and guidelines and, if trying to meeting funding deadlines, allow the 
process to start earlier or use other contracting vehicles. 
 Continuous Monitoring of Project Duration: The team should have re-
evaluated the project duration through the entire review process, 35%, 50%, and 
95%, and then again prior to production of 100%. This would have ensured that 
the duration for all work activities have been considered and factored into the 
project schedule. During 65% review, the Director requested that project duration 
be reduced from 24 months to 13 months.  Construction Management argued that 
a minimum 15 months be allowed for the project, although more would be needed 
to perform current scope of work.  
 Keep Agency Director Informed of Project at Every Review Stage: The 
project team did not provide strong documentation of project scope and project 
schedule from CMs, Cost Engineers, and Schedulers at each review stage to 
Directors. As a result, they failed to understand what is being included in the 
project construction documents prior to bid. This would eliminate demands to 
shorten schedule duration, delete or reduce scope all just to reduce project budget. 
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This would also have ensured that project objectives were cleared and accepted 
when the design package went out for bid. 
 Allow Time to Mitigate All Assumptions: During demolition and hazardous 
material abatement activities, more hazardous materials were discovered in areas 
that were not previously tested. As a result, additional days were added to the 
project to complete removal of additional hazardous materials. The team should 
have included ample time in the review process to survey building, perform initial 
or additional testing to fully identify all unknowns, such as hazardous materials, 
limited cavity spaces for routing conduits/wiring, loading restrictions, etc.  
 Develop team charter and roles during early pre-project planning: Project 
disruptions were caused by team members who assumed project lead roles, but 
lacked the necessary qualifications for managing the design and construction 
efforts on this project, as well as coordination of multiple requirements and 
people. Once project schedule slipped drastically, the amount of unresolved 
change orders, and moral of internal staff began to impact General Contractor’s 
and his subcontractors’ performance, then Upper Management stepped in and 
made required change in project lead. The project team allowed personalities to 
dictate or make demands that impacted the project outcome. Requirements from 
all upper Management, who may not be on project management team, should 
have been in place to sign charter and agree to not force changes to construction 
management, life-safety, and security policies and procedures.  
4.8. CASE STUDY 8: UNMITIGATED ASSUMPTIONS AND LATE PERMIT APPROVAL 
FOR LNG PIPELINE INSTALL  
This case study investigates a construction project involving the installation of a 
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natural gas pipe line that did not have proper regulatory licensing in place prior to 
mobilizing and ultimately leading to various negative impacts. Table 19 identifies 
(asterisked and highlighted in yellow) precisely which premature start drivers, leading 
indicators and impacts occurred in this case. 
Table 19: Case Study 8 Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
*Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
*Cost Overruns 
*Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start 
Late Design Deliverables *Out of Sequence Work 
*Time to Market *Unrealistic Schedule *Overtime/Unplanned Work 
*Seasonal/Weather Constraints Material Not Available *Schedule Slippage 
Regulatory Compliance 
Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
*Rework 
Capital Availability *Unmitigated Assumptions *Poor Productivity 
*Contractor Eager to Get Started Unclear Project Objectives Scope Not Identified 
*Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
*Lack of Regulatory License/Permits 
*Facility Start-up/Production 
Delay 
*Contractor Mobilization in Order 





*Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
Poor Morale 
  *Litigation/Claims 
  *Safety Exposure 
  Failure to Attract/Maintain Craft 
Company Profile 
The Owner company on this project belongs to the heavy industrial oil and gas 
sector specializing in midstream gathering and transport. Areas of operation include 
North America, Canada, and various offshore sites. For this project, engineering and 
procurement was done in-house by the Owner’s engineering team. The Owner hired a 
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Contractor for construction. 
Project Overview 
This was a greenfield, natural gas infrastructure pipeline project in northern 
United States. The project was being funded through a joint venture agreement between 
three entities. Project scope consisted of seventeen miles of 24” high performance (HP) 
steel pipeline. The total original expected budget for the project was $44.2 million. The 
Owner who completed the engineering and procurement for the project awarded the 
project in two sections to two different general contractors, Contractor #1 and Contractor 
#2. Contractor #1 would build from the north and Contractor #2 would build from the 
south. Both portions were awarded by hard bid based on issued for construction (IFC) 
drawing packages.    
The Northern portion of the project was completed in November of 2013 by 
Contractor #1. The southern half of the project was expected to start in October 2013 
(November 2013 actual start) and was to be completed in December of 2013 (not 
completed until May of 2014) by Contractor #2. The cause of the November delay 
happened because Contractor #2 could not begin construction until the northern portion 
of the project was completed. The second reason was that clarification of the bid took 
longer than expected.  
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Table 20: Project summary of cost and schedule 
Sector Oil and Gas 
Project Type Midstream Pipe Line 
Construction Location Northeast USA 
Contract Type Design, Bid, Build 
Baseline Project Cost $44.2 million 
Actual Project Cost (TIC) $50.5 million 
Total Project Baseline Duration 3 months (southern pipe install) 
Total Project Actual Duration 7 months 
Critical startup of an associated compressor station was dependent on completion 
of the southern portion of the project. The facility was complete in February, but startup 
of it was delayed until May once the pipeline was in service. The interruption was caused 
on the southern half of the project by a lack of railroad crossing permits.  The drill was 
originally scheduled for start on December 1st of 2013, and beat the winter weather, but 
it actually started in mid-February once the railroad company finally felt comfortable 
approving the crossing. Then, due to the late start to the Horizontal Directional Drill 
(HDD), the project was delayed further. During the time of construction, the winter of the 
first polar vortex was occurring and access roads to the bore site were degraded.  Terrain 
is described as mountainous and trucks had difficulty traveling uphill. Drilling mud 
circulation lost pressure due to the cold temperature. The bore also hit unexpected rock 
and caused drilling tools to get hung up in the hole causing further delays. 
Driver(s) 
This project faced several elements that drove the project to begin prematurely. 
One significant driver was Seasonal / Weather Constraints. The project start was rushed 
because the winter weather in the region made underground drilling very difficult and 
very costly. Due to the fact that we really needed to get the compressor station 
commissioned to avoid contractual penalties from the upstream producer, the owner was 
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highly motivated to begin construction on both the facility and the pipeline and be in-
service by January 2014.  Also, the owner received better pipeline construction rates if 
the project was completed before January due to higher construction rates that kicked into 
effect Jan.1.  Winter construction also proved to result in more Environmental Health and 
Safety (EHS) incidents which there was a big push to decrease total incident rate in 2014. 
The contractor and associated sub-contractor for the HDD had already had a rig in the 
area and dedicated to the project and were incurring costs on it. The earlier they could get 
started, the less mobilization they had to pay for on this rig and the more efficiently they 
could use it on this project, which was reflected in their lower pricing when competitively 
bid out. In summary, the drivers identified in this case were: 
 Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule 
 Owner Perceived Benefit of Early Start 
 Time to Market 
 Seasonal / Weather Constraints 
 Contractor Eager to Get Started 
 Contractor Perceived Benefit for Early Start 
 Contractor Mobilization in Order to Start Billing 
Impact(s) 
The impacts that resulted were 14% cost growth and 5 months delay to the in-
service date. These were caused by much out of sequence work associated with work 
around for the pipeline contractor having to work on other parts of the pipeline while 
waiting for the owner to obtain the permit. The contractors had to work overtime and 
through the winter to make up the lost schedule days which resulted in rework as more 
than average number of cut-outs were required upon final inspection. Additionally, there 
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were a higher than average number of environmental and safety incidents and ongoing 
concerns from reclamation work associated with winter construction. There was 
reputational damage and trust lost with the railroad company as well as with the Owner’s 
customers and joint venture partners on their ability to meet the schedule.  $14MM in 
pending litigation with the general pipeline Contractor #2 also not reflected in the 
estimate at completion. This is mainly a result of standby due to poor communication to 
the HDD Contractor on when they could mobilize the rig based on expected dates to 
receive the railroad crossing, unexpected rock hit during drilling, and winter weather 
construction. The impacts of these interruptions are summarized below: 
 Cost Overruns 
 Out of Sequence Work 
 Overtime/Unplanned Work 
 Schedule Slippage 
 Rework 
 Poor Productivity 
 Facility Start-up / Production Delay 
 Relationship / Reputational Damage 
 Litigation / Claims 
 Safety Exposure 
Leading Indicators 
Potential leading indicators of a premature start for this project include lack of the 
railroad crossing permit from the railroad company. The Owner typically allocates 90 
days in the schedule for obtaining this permit. Due to the railroad company changing 
ownership since our last dealings with them, this one took much longer than the 90 days 
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at 212 days.  The project went ahead to construction without a railroad permit hoping to 
get permit in 90 days. Other leading indicators include Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization. Leading indicators identified on this project include the 
following: 
 Unrealistic Schedule 
 Unmitigated Assumptions 
 Lack of Regulatory License / Permits 
 Contract Terms in Place That Incentivizes Mobilization 
Lessons Learned 
This section will address the various lessons learned from the project outcomes 
and provide strategies to address each issue. 
 Unmitigated Assumptions on Permit Approval: The owner had based all of 
their construction workflow on the previous permit turnaround timeline which 
was on average 90 days. Construction mobilization took effect after the 90 day 
clock was over but the permit was still not approved nor would be for quite some 
time. If the owner had worked more diligently with the railroad committee and 
communicated progress on permit approval to the team in a more timely fashion, 
construction would have had more foresight into the mobilization of their crews. 
The process should be started much earlier in the lifecycle of the project. 
 Owners Continuous Drive for Overly Aggressive Schedule: This is a 
reoccurring leading indicator for the owner.  The pressures of the onset of winter 
and avoiding being the bottleneck for the facility startup added to the owners 
drive for a schedule that was unrealistic. Planning such projects out ahead to 
allow contingency time in the schedule for permit approvals and wintertime 
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construction delays should be a part of the owners project development on future 
projects. In the end, although the intent to save costs for the core customers and 
begin revenue from production were at the heart of the owner, its clear beginning 
such work without all bases covered oftentimes delivers the opposite results. 
4.9. DISCUSSION 
From the in-depth case studies, the following initial drivers were identified: 
owner’s schedule (time to market, early completion/occupation date), production and 
commodity prices, grant and financial requirements/capital availability, liquidated 
damages, and cultural issues. This initial list of drivers was revised and expanded after 
the development of several more in-depth case studies. Also, lists of leading indicators 
and project impacts were developed based on RT 323’s collective team expertise, as well 
as in-depth case studies. In total, nine drivers, ten leading indicators, and thirteen impacts 
were identified in research thrust one and can be seen below.  
 Premature Start Drivers: Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive Schedule; Owner 
Perceived Benefit for Early Start; Time to Market; Seasonal/Weather Constraints; 
Regulatory Compliance; Capital Availability; Contractor Eager to Get Started; 
Contractor Perceived Benefit for Early Start; Contractor Mobilization in Order to 
Start Billing. 
 Leading Indicators: Engineering Documentation not Complete; Late Design 
Deliverables; Unrealistic Schedule; Material not Available; Vendor Information 
Unavailable Prior to Design; Unmitigated Assumptions; Unclear Project 
Objectives; Lack of Regulatory License/Permits; Unsupportive Management; 
Contract Terms in Place that Incentivizes Mobilization. 
 Project Impacts: Cost Overruns; Overtime/Unplanned Work; Schedule Slippage; 
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Out of Sequence Work; Rework; Poor Productivity; Facility Start-up/Production 
Delay; Scope not Identified; Relationship/Reputational Damage; Poor Morale; 
Safety Exposure; Litigation/Claims; Failure to Attract/Maintain Craft. 
As the case study research progressed, development and discovery of new terms 
diminished, prompting RT 323 to cease pursuing additional case studies. Having reached 
the point of diminishing returns, RT 323 decided to base the remaining research approach 
off the categories and terms listed above. Each of these drivers, leading indicators, and 
impacts are defined in the next chapter of this report. 
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Chapter 5: Definitions 
From the in-depth case studies, three categories were identified: drivers, leading 
indicators, and impacts. Each category contains terms that were defined and documented. 
Since these categories and terms were to be used in subsequent research thrust, each term 
had to be clearly defined. Careful consideration was given to each definition and was 
evaluated by both owners and contractors. This ensured a non-biased approach to 
defining and categorizing each term. This chapter contains a list of those definitions 
developed by RT 323, including definitions for drivers, leading indicators, and impacts.  
5.1. DRIVER CATEGORIES 
Drivers are understood as a condition or requirement that initiates a sequence of 
events. Below is a list of drivers of premature starts identified by RT 323 and their 
respective definitions. 
 Time to Market: Represents the owner’s market-driven timeline for getting a 
product to the consumer.  
 Capital Availability: Represents the point at which an organization has approved 
funding. Capital funding is threatened at a future time if you don’t start now. 
 Owner mandated overly aggressive schedule: Owner has set dates without 
sufficient design and planning. Not feasible or valid based on expert input. 
 Owner perceived benefit for early start: Owner believes that by starting early 
benefits will be found, for example a lower risk to schedule, public relations 
opportunities. 
 Contractor perceived benefit from early start: Contractor believes that by 
starting early benefits will be found, for example a lower risk to schedule, 
manpower availability, contractual incentives more achievable. 
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 Contractor eager to get started: The natural tendency for construction 
contractors to begin work as early as possible believing the project will benefit.  
The construction contractor is dedicating resources and pushing to mobilize early, 
imposing pressure on the owner to release premature construction drawings.  
 Contractor mobilization in order to start billing: The construction contractor 
has resources to dedicate to the project and/or is incentivized to mobilize early in 
order to retain these resources and commence project billing. Contract terms and 
owner oversight could be important factors for this driver.  
 Regulatory Compliance: Any requirements imposed by an outside agency with 
authority over the approval and/or requirement of the project. An example would 
be air permit approval from Department of Environmental Quality prior to a 
natural gas facility startup or receiving an occupancy permit from the delegated 
agency prior to occupying a newly constructed building.  
 Seasonal/Weather constraints: External environmental factors in a specified 
region that should be considered in the project scope, budget, and schedule 
creation. These constraints can be imposed by an authorized agency or by natural 
circumstances. An example of this would be planning summer construction on a 
building project in an artic climate to avoid large crane work and hanging roof 
panels in a cold, windy environment or planning a bridge project in Louisiana 
outside of hurricane season.  
5.2. LEADING INDICATOR CATEGORIES 
Leading Indicators are understood as an early warning sign or red flag that could 
signal a premature start to construction. Below is a list of leading indicators of premature 
starts identified by RT 323 and their respective definitions. 
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 Unrealistic schedule: A schedule that does not have ‘buy-in’ by all stake holders; 
for example a schedule that is known to be more aggressive than previous 
experience would suggest, a schedule risk analysis (SRA) reflects low chance of 
success.  
 Engineering Documentation Not Complete: The information to be provided by 
engineering is either incorrect or missing. 
 Material not available: Materials or Equipment are not onsite or at the workface 
at the time the craft requires.  
 Unclear project objectives: Drivers for the project are not well known 
throughout all stake holders. 
 Unmitigated Assumptions: Assumptions determined at the beginning of the 
project were not considered or resolved. 
 Contract terms in place that incentivize mobilization: The contract is 
structured in a manner that milestone payments are tied to mobilization or 
conditions that may influence mobilizing. 
 Unsupportive management: Management of the project does not have a focus 
on the possible impacts of mobilization; for example incompetent or disengaged 
manager. 
 Late Design Deliverables: Engineering information was not provided to the 
project when promised. 
 Lack of Regulatory license/permits: License and / or permits were late in 
approval. 
 Vendor information unavailable prior to design: Original Equipment 
Manufacturer information was not provided and / or approved when required. 
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5.3. IMPACT CATEGORIES 
Impacts are understood as a result or outcome due to a premature start to 
construction. Below is a list of impacts of premature starts identified by RT 323 and their 
respective definitions. 
 Cost Overruns: A cost overrun, also known as a cost increase or budget overrun, 
involves unexpected costs incurred in excess of budgeted amounts due to an 
underestimation of the actual cost during budgeting.  
 Overtime / Unplanned Work: Unplanned overtime required to overcome an 
unexpected bottleneck or to alleviate a 'behind schedule' situation due to an 
interruption, outage. 
 Rework: Correcting of defective, failed, or non-conforming item, during or after 
inspection. Rework includes all follow-on efforts such as disassembly, repair, 
replacement, and reassembly. Rework could be required because of unidentified 
scope, vendor, engineering, or construction errors. 
 Out of sequence work: Work not conforming to the order of the intended plan.  
 Poor Productivity: Performing below the expected baseline productivity rate. 
 Scope not Identified: A result of an existing condition or objective NOT 
identified or inferred. 
 Schedule Slippage: A delay in completion of project milestones or activities.  
 Facility Start-up / Production Delay: Delay to the use of a capital asset. 
 Litigations / Claims: A dispute due to an event or change beyond the terms of an 
agreement. 
 Safety Exposure: Creating an environment or situation that increases safety risk. 
 Failure to attract / Maintain Craft: Creating an environment or situation that 
makes it difficult to recruit and/or retain skilled and productive craft labor. 
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 Poor Morale: An environment or culture where enthusiasm is reduced. This 
could be due to delays, standby, rework, or management issues.   
 Relationship / Reputation Damage: Strain on a personal or professional 
relationship which can harm reputation. 
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Chapter 6: Research Findings 
This chapter contains the research results and findings from all research thrusts 
and data acquisition techniques utilized by RT 323. The chapter is broken up into three 
parts. The first section discusses the results from the qualitative case study based 
approach. Following the results from the first research thrust, the second research thrust 
results are outlined and discussed in detail. The final section of this chapter will discuss 
the implications of the overall research findings.  
6.1. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH RESULTS 
The first research thrust focused on identifying drivers and leading indicators 
associated with premature starts through case study based research. RT 323 began this 
research phase with pilot case studies submissions from each team member. Each pilot 
case study was carefully reviewed in order to ensure that the project fit the definition of a 
premature start. After two rounds of pilot case study submissions, RT 323 evaluated a 
total of twenty pilot case studies, of which eight were classified as a premature start case. 
Each case study contains at least one element of a premature start to construction. The 
drivers of each premature start differ from case to case but the single most common 
driver, found on every case study, was owner mandated overly aggressive schedule. The 
two least common premature start drivers, found on only once on two separate cases, was 
contractor mobilization in order to start billing and contractor perceived benefit to start 
early. Table 21 briefly summarizes each case study and which drivers were discovered on 
that particular project. 
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Table 21: In-Depth Case Studies Summary 
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Early Start, Time to Market, Regulatory 










Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive 
Schedule, Owner Perceived Benefit For 
Early Start, Time to Market, Seasonal / 
Weather Constraints, Contractor Eager to Get 
Started, Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start, Contractor Mobilization in Order 
to Start Billing 
For research thrust one, the team followed a two-step case study analysis process 
as follows: 
 Intra-case analysis: description of a single project with a documented premature 
start, impacts, drivers, potential leading indicators; 
 Cross-case analysis: section cut of common information across all cases to 
identify commonalities and patterns in drivers, impacts and leading indicators. 
For each case study, RT 323 identified the company or organization profile to 
serve as background information for the reader. Project team members were interviewed; 
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a narrative containing drivers that led to the premature start, the main interruption, and 
the impacts of that interruption to construction were documented. These items were then 
tabulated, as shown in Table 22. 
Table 22: Premature Start Drivers, Leading Indicators, and Impacts 
Premature Start Drivers Leading Indicators Project Impacts 
Owner Mandated Overly 
Aggressive Schedule 
Engineering Documentation Not 
Complete 
Cost Overruns 
Owner Perceived Benefit For Early 
Start 
Late Design Deliverables 
Overtime/Unplanned 
Work 
Time to Market Unrealistic Schedule Schedule Slippage 
Seasonal/Weather Constraints Material Not Available Out of Sequence Work 
Regulatory Compliance 
Vendor Information Unavailable 
Prior to Design 
Rework 
Capital Availability Unmitigated Assumptions Poor Productivity 
Contractor Eager to Get Started Unclear Project Objectives 
Facility Start-up / 
Production Delay 
Contractor Perceived Benefit for 
Early Start 
Lack of Regulatory License / 
Permits 
Scope Not Identified 
Contractor Mobilization in Order 





Contract Terms in Place That 
Incentivizes Mobilization 
Poor Morale 
  Safety Exposure 
  Litigation / Claims 
  
Failure to Attract / 
Maintain Craft 
These categories represent the extent of premature start drivers, leading 
indicators, and impacts that were identified and documented through research thrust one. 
Definitions of each item can be found in Implementation Resource 323-2. Research thrust 
two expanded research thrust one by quantifying each category by surveying industry 
professionals. Through this method, the research team obtained a rating of commonality 
of each driver, leading indicator, and impact.  
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6.2. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH RESULTS 
This section discusses the outcomes from the survey-based research conducted by 
RT 323. Outcomes from the case study based research approach were taken into account 
during data gathering from the survey approach. This included using the categories and 
terms defined during the case study research phase. In order to capture the construction 
background of each respondent, question one and two ask which industry sector and 
company he respondent is associated with. Question one askes “which of the following 
best describes your company”. Possible answer to question one could be either of the 




Figure 2: Results from question one of the survey. 
Figure 2 represents the breakdown of survey respondents. The majority of survey 
respondents were made up of owners and contractors. Slightly over one-tenth of the 
respondents were from engineering firms. Those companies that fell into the “other” 
category were suppliers, vendors, and insurance companies.  
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Figure 3: Further breakdown of the results from question one. 
Figure 3, derived from question one, groups the respondents by owner and 
contractor. Based on what the respondents entered in the “other” category, the team split 
them into either an owner or contractor classification. Of the 16% of “others”, only 2-3% 
fell into the owner category. Of the respondents, there was roughly a 50/50 split between 
owners and contractors. This relatively equal split indicates that there should be minimal 
bias in the results by one viewpoint versus another.  Of the respondents, 93 associated 
with Owners and 99 associated with Construction Contractors. There still appears to be 
an even breakdown between owners and contractors. Of the contractor category, there 
was representation from both construction and engineering which broadens the 
viewpoints for consideration of the data. Also in the contractor portion of “other”, there 
was representation from procurement companies, which helps confirm representation 
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from all aspects of the EPC spectrum. 
Question two of the survey addresses which industry sector the responding 
companies belong to. Figure breaks down the respondents by CII-defined industry 
sectors. These results suggest that the data captured a broad range of industry types 
indicating a broader viewpoint taken with the data. Although the data shows we have 
covered the four main sectors (i.e., heavy industrial, light industrial, buildings, 
infrastructure), the predominant classification was heavy industry at 76% of the 
respondents. 
 
Figure 4: Survey respondents classified into CII defined industry sectors. 
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For questions three through six, the respondents were asked to answer while 
thinking of their overall construction project related experience rather than one individual 
project. This was meant to obtain a comprehensive look at the occurrence of drivers and 
leading indicators throughout the construction industry rather than a single project, which 
would potentially be considered an outlier. The subsequent questions utilize the Likert 
scale by asking respondents to answer questions by selecting a number one through five, 
where one is least common and five is most common. 
Question three addresses the likelihood of occurrence of a premature start driver. 
The question is worded as follows: “Rate how often each driver causes a premature start 
to construction. Results are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Question three of the survey asking respondents to rate how often each driver 
causes a premature start to construction. 
Figure 5 shows for any of the listed potential drivers, the frequency for which 
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they cause a premature start to construction. The number displayed represents the average 
rating out of 5 for each driver. From the data, the top three drivers which cause a 
premature start to construction are “Owner mandated overly aggressive schedule”, 
“Owner perceived benefit for early start”, and “Time to Market”, respectively.  It is 
interesting to note that the most significant drivers appear to be owner initiated. 
Figure 6, taken from question three responses, is a spider chart that shows the 
comparison between driver commonality, shown for both owners and contractors. The 
average rating between the two categories suggests strong similarities between owners 
and contractors due to the general shape of each graph being similar. Also, it should be 
noted that for all drivers except for two (e.g., Capital Availability and Seasonal and 
Weather Constraints), the contractor’s ratings on drivers is on average higher than that of 
owners. This could advise that contractors are more concerned about the commonality of 
each of the drivers than owners.  An interesting point on the chart is that of the highest 
rated driver, “Owner mandated overly aggressive schedule” at 4.10 out of 5, there is the 
biggest gap between owner and contractor rating, although both are rated high. Owners 
may be aware of the commonality of this driver and understand its owner created, but do 
not understand its impact on the contractors. 
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Figure 6: Spider graph from question three of the survey, separated by Owner and 
Contractor. 
The next question of the survey, question four, asks the respondents to rate how 
often the following leading indicators are associated with a premature start. The purpose 
of this question was to obtain a quantitative representation of the leading indicators 




Figure 7: Question four of the survey asking respondents to rate how often each leading 
indicators is associated to a premature start to construction. 
Figure 7 shows the frequency that the listed potential leading indicators are 
associated with premature starts to construction. The number displayed represents the 
average rating out of 5 for each “red flag” or leading indicator. From the data, the top 
three leading indicators which cause a premature start to construction are “Engineering 
Documentation not Complete”, “Late Design Deliverables”, and “Unrealistic Schedule”, 
respectively. It is interesting to note that the top two most significant drivers appear to be 




Figure 8: Spider graph from question four of the survey separating Owner and 
Contractor. 
Figure 8 is taken from question 4 responses, is a spider chart that shows the 
comparison between leading indicator commonality between the owner and contractor 
respondents. The average rating between the two categories suggests strong similarities 
between owners and contractors due to the general shape of each graph being similar. 
Also, it should be noted that for all leading indicators, the contractor’s ratings is on 
average higher than that of owners, suggesting they are more sensitive to interrupted 
construction. This could warn that contractors are more aware of the leading indicators 
than owners. An interesting point on the chart is that of the highest rated leading 
indicators, “engineering documentation not complete” and “late design deliverables”, are 
contractor induced. While both owners and contractors see it as an issue due to high 
ratings, contractors may be more aware of the deficiency imposed by them on the owners. 
It’s possible though that there are other owner imposed drivers that may drive these 
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indicators. 
Questions five and six pertain to premature start related impacts. Respondents 
were first asked to rate how often each impact occurs as a direct result from a premature 
start. Secondly, they were asked to rate the severity of each impact as a result of a 
premature start. Survey respondent results can be seen in the following figures.  
 
Figure 9: Results from questions five and six of the survey asking respondents to rate the 
commonality and severity of each impact resulting from a premature start. 
Figure 9 represents data from questions five and six. The red bars in the bar graph 
show impact commonality while the blue bars represent impact severity. They are plotted 
on the chart together to investigate whether there is or is not a relationship between the 
two. The impact commonality is shown from highest ranking to lowest ranking with the 
corresponding severity. For all except four impacts, commonality is greater than severity. 
These four impacts are “Scope not identified”, “Facility start-up/production delay”, 
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“Safety exposure”, and Litigation/claims”. The perception of these impacts favors 
severity, which is understandable. Scope not identified and Facility start-up 
delay/production delay can seriously jeopardize project success if encountered. Similarly, 
safety exposure in industry is extremely scrutinized and an important criteria for 
workforce selection that it should be less common. An industry experience with 
litigations and claims is extremely impactful to reputation and can severely damage 
relationships. 
In general there is a fair agreement in trends between commonality and severity, 
such that the most common impacts are also the most severe and the least common are 
also the least severe. This is further shown in Figure 10 below. 
 
Figure 10: Premature start impacts plotted by severity and commonality. 
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Figure 11: Spider graph from question five of the survey separating Owner and 
Contractor. 
Figure 11, taken from question five responses, is a spider chart that shows the 
comparison between impact commonality between the owner and contractor respondents. 
The average rating between the two categories suggests strong similarities between 
owners and contractors due to the general shape of each graph being similar. This is the 
first chart where owners had some ratings higher than contractors. The impacts that 
owners rated higher than contractors are “Rework”, “Overtime/unplanned work”, and 
“Schedule slippage”, in this order. Schedule slippage, from the owner’s perspective, can 
be seen as a key priority for a lot of owners on projects. Thus the impacts from rework 




Figure 12: Spider graph from question six of the survey separating Owner and 
Contractor. 
Figure 12, taken from question six responses, is a spider chart that shows the 
comparison between impact severity between the owner and contractor respondents.  This 
graph shows the most pronounce differences between owners and contractors ratings on 
the impacts, in terms of degree of severity. This suggests once again that the contractors 
are more sensitive to the severity of these impacts. “Facility start-up/production delay” 
and “Schedule slippage” having higher ratings for the owners than the contractors is 
expected, but counter to expected results for “cost overruns”, the contractors rating is 
higher for this impact. Of the other ratings where the contractors were higher, it’s 
expected they would be higher than the owners, and suggests that the owners understand 
the impact severities but don’t appreciate the impact severity on the contractors. This is 
most evident for “out of sequence work”, “poor productivity”, and “litigation/claims”, 
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which can all affect a contractors relationship to his customers and his craft. 
 
Figure 13: Premature start impact rating developed my multiply the commonality rating 
by the severity rating. 
Figure 13 represents the product of Commonality and Severity for each impact. 
The trend by categories is identical to the trend as categorized by impact commonality 
and severity which suggests consistency in the data. This reinforces the relationship 
between impact commonality and severity. 
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Figure 14: Combined impact commonality and severity data separated by Owner and 
Contractor.  
Figure 14 represents an aggregate of questions five and six. One interesting point 
is that for “rework” and “overtime/unplanned work”, the owner rated these higher in 
terms of commonality whereas the contractor rated these higher in terms of severity, and 
rated higher to the point that when aggregated, it pushed the impact to a higher rating for 
the contractor. The impacts that owners feel the hardest are “facility start-up 
delay/production delay” and “schedule slippage”, which is expected. 
The overall strong similarities between all the spider graphs validates that all the 
respondents are like minded on the impacts to premature starts to construction, but 
contractors are always more sensitive for all of the data comparisons. It may be an 
indicator that contractors see the impacts first, and potentially feel their effects the 
 104 
greatest. 
Question seven asked respondents to answer the question based on their most 
recent project experience that had a premature mobilization. Note that this differs from 
questions three through six, which asked respondents to answer based on all construction 
project related experience. Question seven had four sub-questions, all related to project 
cost and schedule.   
Table 23: Cost and schedule survey results. 
 
Reponses to question seven indicated strong similarity between the cost and 
schedule growth associated with the respondent’s projects that experienced a premature 
start to construction. Given over 130 respondents across all of the industry sectors, the 
data suggests that one should expect a 15% cost and schedule growth on projects that 
experience a premature start to construction. Thus, if a leading indicator is identified in 
the planning phases of a project suggesting a potential for construction interruptions, one 
can draw on this potential for 15% growth and re-evaluate contingency and/or proceeding 
with the project. Question 7c suggests that since there is such a broad range of project 
costs reported in the data, the applicability of this research spans the spectrum of small to 
large value projects. 
6.3. DISCUSSION 
Through research thrust one, RT 323 discovered common factors that can be seen 
on multiple projects of various scope definition, industry sector, and total project value. 
Average Min Median Max
Q7.a - Approx. Project Cost Growth (%) 23.4% 0.5% 15.0% 200.0%
Q7.b - Approx. Schedule Growth (%) 23.2% 0.0% 15.0% 200.0%
Q7.c - Approx. Project Cost (TIC, million of dollars) $185 $0.115 $65 $5,000
Q7.c - Approx. Contract Cost (million of dollars) $134 $0.100 $30 $4,000
Q7 - What was the approximate  cost and schedule growth?
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Commonalities and severities of these items were quantified through survey based 
research and data analysis showing highest commonality and severity towards owner 
induced drivers. Note that these results were derived by surveying a near 50/50 split of 
owners and contractors. For leading indicators or premature starts, the highest rated was 
engineering documentation not complete. Following this leading indicator was late 
design deliverable and unrealistic schedule. Along with these drivers and leading 
indicators, negative cost and schedule impacts were rated highest. These items include, 
cost overruns, overtime / unplanned work, and schedule slippage.  
Drivers, leading indicators, and impacts that were identified last in the case 
studies, and rated low in the survey were contractor related items. The two least common 
drivers of a premature start were identified as contractor perceived benefit of an early 
start and contractor mobilization in order to start billing. According to the survey, these 
were least impactful of driving a premature start to construction. The least common 
leading indicator of a premature start was contract terms in place to incentivize 
mobilization. Impacts from premature starts were least likely to involve safety exposure, 
litigation and claims, and failure to attract and maintain craft.  
The goal of RT 323 was to incorporate these research findings into a tool to aid in 
the construction industry as a practical way of determining a premature start to 
construction. The following chapter will discuss the process, basic features, and 
application of the tool known as the Premature Start Impact Analysis (PSIA) tool. For a 
full in-depth user guide and example application, please see IR 323-2.  
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Chapter 7: Premature Start Impact Analysis Tool 
The Premature Start Impact Analysis (PSIA) tool is used as an objective source of 
information to support decisions regarding construction readiness. The tool contains 
valuable industry data but requires the user to first provide input in order to generate 
output tailored to an organization’s and project’s conditions. 
7.1. DEVELOPMENT 
The PSIA is a Microsoft Excel-based application that utilizes several macros. The 
PSIA works by gathering user input and generating an assessment report by referencing a 
database within the Excel workbook. The PSIA includes all data collected through the 
research process, including 194 survey results, summary calculations, data categories and 
definitions, and example case studies. The tool organizes data in a relational structure to 
link business drivers to leading indicators, and links potential impacts to combinations of 
these factors with applicable case studies that provide detailed real-world examples of 
premature starts. The assessment process follows a fixed series of activities, except for 
the starting step. You can begin the input process either by: 1) selecting your project’s 
business drivers or 2) selecting your project’s leading indicators. Figure 15 and Figure 16 





Figure 15: PSIA Assessment Process Flow – Starting with Business Drivers 
 
Figure 16: PSIA Assessment Process Flow – Starting with Leading Indicators 
The tool was developed using Microsoft Excel Visual Basic programming 
language. Early prototypes of the PSIA were done using wireframe diagrams in 
Microsoft Visio. This allowed RT 323 to tailor the overall user experience of the PSIA 
tool and aided in the general layout and placement of buttons and commands.  
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Figure 17: Early Example of PSIA Graphical User Interface 
Once a layout was reviewed by the team, the design of the tool moved from Visio 
to Excel. In order to make the tool an interactive experience, extensive use of macros and 
Visual Basic coding were implemented. Moreover, the inclusion of a comprehensive 
database depicting the outcomes of each case study was added. Incorporating a database 
of case studies allowed for additional features to be included in the design of the PSIA. 
Such features include prompting the user to RT 323 case studies that pertain specifically 
to the user inputs. The tool works by taking the user inputs and references a database that 
contains all possible driver-leading indicator-impact relationships supported by the 
qualitative case study-based research. Figure 18 represents a snippet of the database that 
is being referenced. The database was created by going through each possible driver-
leading indicator-impact combination and checking if any of the case studies support that 
particular combination.  
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Figure 18: Snippet of PSIA database  
The first column of the spreadsheet lists all of the drivers. With the instance of a 
single driver, there exists a leading indicator occurrence. Within each driver-leading 
indicator relationship, there are associated impacts. The columns label “CS1” through 
“CS8: represent each case study. An “x” in that column indicates that that particular case 
study experienced that driver-leading indicator-impact combination. For example, case 
study 5 (CS5) experienced cost overruns due to an “Owner Mandated Overly Aggressive 
Schedule” and had “Engineering Documentation Not Compete” as a leading indicator. It 
did not, however, experience “Out of Sequence Work” due to the same driver-leading 
indicator combination. 
The purpose of this database was to have the user input drivers and leading 
indicators recognized on their current project and have the tool return potential impacts 
that were identified in this research. For example, if the user selects “Owner Mandated 
Overly Aggressive Schedule” as a potential driver and selects “Engineering 
Documentation Not Complete”, the output warns the user that “Cost Overruns are Likely 
to Occur”. The tool also references the case study that supports this claim as well as the 
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survey data collected during the qualitative phase of this research. For a full explanation 
of PSIA features and example applications, refer IR 323-2. 
7.2. PSIA FEATURES 
In order to make the PSIA more user friendly, the tool was created on a software 
platform that is familiar with most professionals in the construction industry: Microsoft 
Excel. The first few sheets contain help pages with user instructions. The user instruction 
sheet contains a guided step by step instruction and screenshots of various stages of the 
analysis process. Inputs and outputs are condensed in one single sheet, known as the 
‘Assessment Summary’, in order to provide an easy means of determining where the user 




Figure 19: PSIA Assessment Summary 
From here, the user is directed to a list of drivers and leading indicators and 
prompted to make selections of each based on the current project status (see Figure 20). 
After making the appropriate selection, the user returns to the Assessment Summary and 
clicks ‘Generate Report’.  
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Figure 20: Driver selection and Leading Indicator selection pages. 
The tool then generates a printable report of potential impacts based on the 
research case studies and survey results (see Figure 21). The report contains a survey data 
summary, case study links that are based on the user inputs, charts and graphs, and owner 
versus contractor dimensions. 
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Figure 21: An example of a complete report. 
7.3. DEPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The team’s goal in creating the tool was to give stakeholders a user-friendly 
interface that will assist in planning and execution of projects. The tool allows project 
stakeholders to input either their known leading indicators or known drivers at various 
stages prior or during construction. Based on these drivers and / or leading indicators, the 
tool will present the potential impacts to the overall project through quantitative and 
qualitative research data and analysis. Some specific deployment recommendations for 
this tool include the following:  
 114 
Project Risk Assessment  
The inputs and outputs of this tool are tied directly to the Risk Assessment 
Process for the User’s projects. The primary output of the tool is the identification of 
potential impacts to a project based on the known drivers and leading indicators of 
premature starts to construction. These impacts are essentially potential risks to the 
project that the project management team must assess and mitigate. The tool ‘impacts’ 
can be utilized to populate the project’s risk register. The tool also provides the 
commonality and severity of identified risks which can be used to weight the potential 
risks in an existing company risk register. Ultimately, the tool helps to facilitate open 
communication regarding the project based on hard data that feeds the development of 
risk avoidance and mitigation strategies and plans.  
Dispute Prevention and Resolution 
The tool provides a platform for interface between different project stakeholders. 
For example, project managers and construction managers can use the tool to physically 
demonstrate the potential impacts of starting construction prematurely to owners or their 
internal senior management. The tool provides tangible data for review and analysis and 
facilitates open discussion regarding risks and their potential impacts.  
Knowledge Sharing and Transfer 
The tool can serve as a training aid for less trained or experienced project 
stakeholders. It can also simply serve as a tool to share information among team 
members. By knowing and understanding the potential impacts, team members can make 




The tool output includes links to detailed case studies which provide real world 
examples of impacts stemming from premature starts to construction. It also provides real 
examples of drivers and leading indicators that led to real impacts to projects. These 
examples are essentially lessons learned that can be applied to current and future projects.  
7.4. PSIA DEPLOYMENT DEMONSTRATION 
In order to test the applicability of the PSIA, RT 323 chose to use completed 
construction projects from the pilot case study rounds that were not used as in-depth case 
studies. This section will go through two projects that experienced interruptions and use 
the PSIA to see if certain impacts could have been avoided. Note that the projects 
reviewed in this section were NOT used in the development of the PSIA. Projects that 
were used in the development of the PSIA were in-depth case studies only and the project 
characteristics had to clearly satisfy the definition of a premature start as defined by RT 
323. Of the twelve pilot case studies that did not qualify as a premature start, only two 
projects had clear project drivers and leading indicators. The remaining ten pilot case 
studies either had only drivers and no identifiable leading indicators or only leading 
indicators and no discernable driver. The two projects used in this demonstration will be 
referred to as sample projects. 
7.5. SAMPLE PROJECT 1  
This project is an eleven month brownfield chemical plant construction project 
with an original firm bid of $25 million. The goal of owner was to complete the project 
two months early for aggressive marketability. During the engineering design phase, 
piping and instrumentation design (P&ID) was delayed one month, yet no schedule 
changes were made except for reduction and removal of float times. Construction start 
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data was not modified. Prior to mobilization, the foundation design was based on 
assumptions of soil conditions, though geotechnical survey was scheduled. The original 
design was for 30 shallow (20’) drilled piers that were to be done by the civil contractor.  
After a geotechnical survey was completed, new foundation design required that 120, 70’ 
piles would be needed. This required the owner to issue a new contract to get a piling 
contractor. Although the owner was able to rather quickly get a contractor on site who 
had piles in stock, the contractor made surveying error and drove all of the piles in the 
wrong location. This error was not discovered until in the process of pouring pile caps. 
This required a “global” shift of the plant which delayed the schedule by approximately 
one month, costing the owner $650,000. The desire for early plant startup was not met. 
The driver of this project was clearly “time to market”. A leading indicator for 
this project, due to late delivery of piping and instrumentation design, could be classified 
as “late design deliverables”. If we input these items in the PSIA, as shown in Figure 22, 
we should expect to receive outputs that indicate negative impacts that are consistent with 
what actually was experienced by the project team. 
  
Figure 22: An example of user driver and leading indicator inputs for Sample Project 1. 
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Once the user has selected the appropriate driver and leading indicator, the report 
can then be generated. The output of PSIA is shown in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23: PSIA output for Sample Project 1. 
The PSIA correctly identified two project impacts that were identified; “cost 
overruns and “schedule slippage”. The original plant start-up date was not met so the 
PSIA also correctly identified “facility start-up / production delay” as a potential impact. 
Sample Project 1 also stated that certain assumptions concerning soil conditions were 
made prior to mobilization and was later discovered that deeper piers were needed. As a 
result, a new contractor had to quickly drill new piles which later turned out to be in 
wrong locations throughout the site. One of the leading indicators discovered by RT 323 
was “unmitigated assumptions”. The definition of “unmitigated assumptions” according 
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to RT 323 research is any “assumption determined at the beginning of the project which 
was not considered or resolved”. This leading indicator could also be selected in the 
PSIA user input (Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24: Example expanded. 
If the report is generated a second time, now with the inclusion of “unmitigated 
assumptions”, the results would be different (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25: New PSIA impact results. 
As shown in Figure 25, all impacts were highlighted indicating that these impacts 
are potential outcomes of the project given “time to market” as a driver and “late design 
deliverables” and “unmitigated assumptions” as leading indicators. Note how the addition 
of “unmitigated assumptions” added six new potential impacts to the PSIA results. The 
most notable addition to the potential impacts that correlates to the sample project was 
“scope not identified”. The plant had to be shifted from its original global location due to 
the contractor incorrectly driving piles into the wrong location. This was directly 
attributed to soil conditions assumed by the owner, only to later discover that the 
assumptions were incorrect. This lead to a rushed hiring of a civil contractor to drill the 
piers into new locations, which were later deemed incorrect. As a result, the original 
scope of work was not met.  
Sample Project 1 contained one of the top three premature start drivers (Figure 
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26) and two of the top six leading indicators (Figure 27). If the owner and contractor had 
used the PSIA, their attention could have been redirected towards mitigating soil 
condition assumptions and making sure P&ID design deliverables were on-time. This 
could have in turn avoided cost overruns and schedule days.  
 
Figure 26: Sample project 1 driver. 
 
Figure 27: Sample project 1 leading indicators. 
7.6. SAMPLE PROJECT 2 
This project involves the installation of a pipeline and subsea structure to connect 
with an existing transport system. The project also included hook-up and commissioning 
 121 
of new wells and pipeline. The owner of this project was bound by production contracts 
to satisfy minimum feedstock gas quantities to an onshore gas processing plant. Because 
this was the primary feedstock for local electricity provider, a hard-date production 
agreement was executed between owner and onshore gas plant due to criticality of gas 
supply. During execution of the project, with majority of detail design completed, labor 
dispute discussions broke down between local labor unions and the original contractor. 
The original contractor opted to exercise termination clause with owner due to inability to 
resolve the labor dispute after they had already procured pipe and begun fabrication 
process onshore. The owner re-tendered the contract with an alternative contractor who 
then was brought onboard and assumed ownership of project goods/materials. The 
alternative contractor successfully installed the project, though overall owners schedule 
was substantially delayed due to termination of original contractor. The owner faced a 
penalty fee for not meeting feedstock requirements on the hard-date set by the contract. 
For this project, the owner was bound by contract to a local electricity provider to 
deliver a minimum feedstock on a hard deadline, in which not doing so would result in a 
penalty. With that, it could be said that the driver for this project is “regulatory 
compliance”. Recall that the definition for regulatory compliance is “any requirements 
imposed by an outside agency with authority over the approval and/or requirement of the 
project”. Although the electricity provider does not have authority of approving the 
project, it does, however, require that key resources to be delivered through the project 
making the pipeline install a requirement. The leading indicators on this project are not so 
easily identifiable. When an owner hires a contractor, the contractor is assumed to have 
good relationships, knowledge, and understanding of the local labor unions. Because of 
the assumption regarding the contractor’s relationship with craft labor, “unmitigated 
assumptions” is the leading indicator that is most applicable. For sample project 2, the 
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driver was selected as “regulatory compliance” and the leading indicator was 
“unmitigated assumptions”. With these two drivers and leading indicators selected, the 
outcome is shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: Sample project 2 PSIA impact results. 
The PSIA identified six negative project outcomes. Sample project 2 incurred a 
monetary penalty so the original project budget was exceeded. “Facility start-up / 
production delay” was not identified by the PSIA, however, “schedule” slippage was a 
reported potential impact and for a project that has a hard deadline, this could be a critical 
impact that needs to be further evaluated. This could be done by using other means of 
risk assessment such as the PDRI which covers topics such as labor shortage, strikes, and 
contract disputes (Gibson and Dumont 1995). 
  
 123 
7.7. EXAMPLE APPLICATION 
The following sections provide example applications for the PSIA by different 
stakeholders within the project team. These examples apply to both owner and contractor 
organizations.  
Senior Project Management 
The PSIA is effective when used by Senior Project Managers at the start of each 
phase of the project. Project Managers can use the PSIA to assist in the project’s risk 
assessment process. This tool provides an indication of the commonality and severity of 
potential impacts which are direct inputs to the project team’s risk assessment and prompt 
discussion regarding mitigation action. The PSIA data can also be used to compare the 
severity of potential impact to the cost of mitigation. The PSIA also provides information 
to help Project Managers when developing the project schedule and project execution 
plan with regard to pre-construction activities and site mobilization. When engaged in 
client meetings, a contractor’s Project Manager can defend a position to delay starting 
construction using hard data. Or an owner’s Project Manager can clearly explain 
motivations when faced with a contractor eager to start digging. In any scenario the PSIA 
provides a Project Manager with unbiased validated data to use in both preventative and 
reactionary modes on a project.  
Construction Management 
The PSIA is effective when used by Construction Management at the start of each 
phase of the project. Construction Management can use the PSIA to assist in the project’s 
risk assessment process. This tool provides an indication of the commonality and severity 
of potential impacts which are direct inputs to the project team’s risk assessment and 
prompt discussion regarding mitigation action. The PSIA data can also be used to 
 124 
compare the severity of potential impact to the cost of mitigation. The PSIA also provides 
information to help Construction Management when developing the project schedule and 
project execution plan with regard to pre-construction activities and site mobilization. 
The tool can be deployed in pre-mobilization meetings in conjunction with other tools 
and processes to help assess the project team’s readiness to mobilize. The output of the 
tool also gives construction more influence earlier than typical because of the unbiased 
justification provided by real quantitative data and case studies. The data can be utilized 
by Construction Management to justify the urgency of engineering deadlines and 
influence engineering deliverable dates. The construction and senior management teams 
can use it as a communication tool with a common language and shared perspective 
regarding late deliverable impacts. The tool also can be used to present reasons for 
extending a schedule based on indicators identified in the current project.  
Project Controls 
Project Controls can use the PSIA to assist in the project’s risk assessment 
process. This tool provides an indication of the commonality and severity of potential 
impacts which are direct inputs to the project team’s risk assessment and prompt 
discussion regarding mitigation action. The PSIA data can also be used to compare the 
severity of potential impact to the cost of mitigation. The output of the project tool 
provides essential details for the project schedule development. These details help 
identify schedule tasks where contingencies should be built in to the schedule. The results 
from a PSIA query can be used as supporting documentation for schedule and or cost 
impacts to the project, building more float for critical deliverables. The tool would also 
be beneficial for developing recovery plans for actual late deliverables to the jobsite. The 
PSIA will help forecast the impacts of known late deliverables and support “What if?” 
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analysis during recovery from a specific event.  
Engineering and Procurement 
The impacts identified by this tool can help engineering and procurement team 
members plan and prioritize their resources such as staffing and budget. For example, in a 
situation where the commonality and severity of an impact is high based on identified 
drivers and leading indicators, the engineering/procurement manager can increase their 
staff, work hours or other resources to reduce the potential of the impact. The tool 
provides data that will facilitate the communication of design expectations / design 
completion required to prevent interruptions to construction. It also facilitates 
communication between the engineering / procurement team and the construction team 
regarding this topic and thus leads to a more efficient design process. The tool will 
provide procurement supportive data to more accurately emphasize requirements for 
vendor data.  
Executive / Business Management 
The PSIA provides an unbiased industry-based reference to help resolve disputes 
over commercial issues or disagreements with owners/contractors and supply-chain 
organizations. It will provide management with less construction experience the ability to 
understand the issues and impacts. At a portfolio level, the PSIA helps identify lessons 
learned that can be applied to future projects.  
7.8. LIMITATIONS 
The PSIA helps project teams identify potential issues and the project outcomes 
that might be affected, and prompt project teams to develop plans to mitigate or avoid 
risk. It does not, however, provide actions to mitigate risks associated with premature 
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starts to construction. The PSIA does not provide the actual cost increases or time delays 
associated with a premature start. Each project team will have to estimate the value/cost 
of any impacts on a case-dependent basis; this is because the quantitative impacts of late 
deliverables can be vastly different from one project to another, depending upon project 
size, type, complexity, and other variables.  
Because the data used as the basis for PSIA and associated resources was 
collected within an 18-month period, they do not capture all possible impacts. Although 
RT 323 identified the most likely cases, the unique circumstances of every project can 
produce situations that have not occurred in the past and that cannot be foreseen through 
research. The intent of RT 323 is for the PSIA to be updated and maintained by 
individual companies to include new impacts experienced on their projects.  
Since this research has been primarily focused on industrial construction projects, 
the PSIA predominantly addresses conditions leading to premature starts in these types of 
projects. Not all industries, drivers, leading indicators are represented in case studies. RT 
323 selected case studies to represent a variety of drivers and indicators, industries, 
organization types, and other criteria.  
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Chapter 8: Lessons Learned 
Throughout the data collection phase from both research thrusts, RT 323 
developed a list of lessons learned and recommendations for preventing premature starts 
to construction. This chapter includes two sections: one discussing the lessons learned of 
the survey and case study research, the other discussing PSIA implementation 
recommendations. 
8.1. CASE STUDY AND SURVEY LESSONS LEARNED 
Throughout research thrust one, many commonalities amongst project drivers and 
outcomes with unique similarities were discovered. At the end of each case study a 
lessons learned section was drafted based on the interviewee’s project experience. The 
lessons learned for the case studies were interpreted by schedule, risk, communication, 
and alignment. The identified lessons learned were categorized by these four items and 
discussed in detail below. 
Schedule 
The in-depth case studies provide several examples of the extent of impact that 
premature starts can have on a project schedule. The case studies highlight the concept 
that starting construction prior to having a thorough plan and necessary design 
deliverables can result in rework, cost overruns, schedule slippage, etc. In all case studies, 
had the project teams spent the time and resources necessary to identify the drivers and 
leading indicators to premature starts, the impact to the project schedule would have been 
mitigated. Specific schedule related lessons learned from the in-depth case studies 
include the following: 
 Importance of schedule integration between Engineering, Procurement & 
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Construction; 
 Approval of rework/scope change should include approval of schedule impact; 
 Awareness and management of owners’ continuous drive for overly aggressive 
schedule; and 
 Continuous monitoring of project duration. 
Risk 
The in-depth case studies also highlight the need for identifying drivers and 
leading indicators to premature starts during the risk assessment and mitigation process.  
The impacts of starting early may be more or less severe than the impact to the project if 
a construction activity does not start. Thus, by identifying leading indicators early, a 
project team can assess the potential impacts of starting early and compare those to the 
potential impact of not starting. Although premature start analysis does not take the place 
of a thorough risk assessment, it certainly serves as significant input in the risk mitigation 
process. Specific risk related lessons learned from the in-depth case studies include: 
 Conduct detailed risk analysis on front end costs vs. potential benefits; 
 Follow agency standard procedures and guidelines; and 
 Risk assessment is necessary to identify and derive mitigating strategy for 
significant aspects of the project. 
Interface / Communication 
In the Construction industry, communication is the most difficult and most 
important task that we perform. In several of the case studies, a breakdown in 
communication often resulted in an impact to the overall project success. Often, one of 
the project stakeholders did not know or understand that another stakeholder was lacking 
necessary information needed to perform. The lack of design deliverables and vendor 
 129 
data specifically resulted in premature starts and impacts to cost, schedule and 
productivity. Early in the project, stakeholders need to identify and communicate the 
need for specific information and align their resources so that this information can be 
produced in a sequence that supports the project schedule. Clear communication can 
mitigate the leading indicators and drivers that lead to premature starts. Specific 
communication related lessons learned from the in-depth case studies include: 
 Fully validate constructability program and path of construction in relation to 
schedule and clearly document changes immediately after contract award; 
 Provide construction contractor access to procurement documentation;  
 Assess unmitigated assumptions prior to permit approval; 
 Keep agency director informed of project at every review stage; 
 Assure scope definition is understood by all project stakeholders; 
 Understand premature mobilization implications; 
 Develop interface management protocol; and 
 Have a change management process to assess and communicate impacts. 
Alignment 
Project stakeholders often have their own perceived needs and agendas when 
conducting their project. However, the best results for a project are achieved when 
stakeholders’ needs and agendas are aligned. The in-depth case studies reveal that drivers 
such as a ‘perceived benefit to getting started’ or ‘overly aggressive schedules’ often 
result in premature starts and ultimately, negative impacts to construction. This fact 
suggests that early and periodic alignment meetings can go a long way in ensuring the 
success of a project. Specific alignment related lessons learned from the in-depth case 
studies include: 
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 Front end evaluation of available resources and their allocation to the project; 
 Establish an integrated team and assess joint capability to meet project 
requirements; 
 Allow time to mitigate assumptions; 
 Develop team charter and roles during early pre-project planning; 
 Follow all company procedures and regulations; 
 Establish initial project alignment; 
 Misunderstanding of stakeholder roles and project scope; and 
 Conflict and priority of drivers lead to misalignment on project objectives. 
8.2. PSIA IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the most important planning decisions on a major capital project is 
determining the right time to start construction. RT 323 has learned how premature starts 
can lead to cascading impacts that not only affect cost and schedule but can compromise 
safety, damage valuable business relationships and drive companies into costly litigation. 
Restarting and recovering from these decisions is extremely difficult where skilled trades 
and scarce resources come into play. Multiple parties, each with different business 
objectives and motivations, strongly influence the planning process and can swiftly move 
the project toward the wrong decision.  
CII identified the need for research and implementation tools to support decision 
making around construction starts. Through collection and analysis of data from expert 
input, industry surveys and case studies, RT 323 has identified the most common 
business drivers, leading indicators and impacts for premature starts. Notable findings 
include: 
 The top business drivers are owner initiated, as acknowledged by both owners and 
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contractors. 
 The top leading indicators are related to incomplete or delayed design 
deliverables. 
The top impacts represent a wider range of issues and are closely distributed from 
cost and schedule overruns to compromised safety, facility production delay and 
litigations and claims. There is a fair agreement among owners and contractors for impact 
commonality and severity, such that the most common impacts are also the most severe 
and the least common are also the least severe. 
RT 323 recommends the use of its PSIA. The PSIA should be applied as part of a 
project’s overall risk assessment process as an objective tool to identify risk associated 
with construction readiness. Project leaders should use it as evidence to support planning 
discussions or to defend decisions to postpone construction starts. It may also be used as 
a means of negotiating with other parties. Like other risk assessment tools and 
techniques, it should be used at different stages of construction planning, where different 
indicators are likely to appear and decision impacts may be greatest, not just when the 
construction mobilization go/no-go order is imminent. 
The PSIA can be completed in less than ten minutes since only a few questions 
are asked to the user. For this reason, the PSIA may be used multiple times during one 
single evaluation. The PSIA alone will not ensure successful projects. When combined 
with sound business planning, alignment, and good project execution, it can greatly 
improve the probability of meeting or exceeding project objectives. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and Recommendations 
The primary value of this research is to guide CII members and others involved in 
projects to an improved understanding of the drivers, impacts, and leading indicators of 
premature starts that can be used to improve project delivery. RT 323 envisions that such 
findings will be incorporated into project risk assessment and overall planning, and will 
facilitate communication between stakeholders. The main outcomes of this research will: 
 Help contractors in demonstrating and communicating to owners and stakeholders 
the severity of the potential outcome of a premature start to a project; and 
 Provide a better understanding of how a premature start can impact a project. 
Throughout the research, RT 323 discovered many actions an organization can 
and should take in order to avoid a premature start to construction. The team developed 
the following list of items that readers should take into account when considering project 
schedule, risk and stakeholder alignment: 
 Recognize the importance of schedule integration between engineering, 
procurement and  construction; 
 Conduct a detailed risk analysis on front end costs versus potential benefits; 
 Fully validate the constructability program and path of construction in relations to 
schedule; 
 Provide construction contract access to procurement documentation; and 
 Establish an integrated team and assess joint capabilities to meet project 
requirements. 
In order to aid in the implementation of RT 323 findings, the team recommends 
integrating the PSIA into their organizations pre-project planning risk assessment 
process. Some specific deployment recommendations for this tool include the following:  
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 Project risk assessment; 
 Dispute prevention and resolution; 
 Knowledge sharing and transfer; and 
 Lessons learned. 
The PSIA helps project teams identify potential issues and the project outcomes 
that might be affected, and prompt project teams to develop plans to mitigate or avoid 
risk. It does not provide actions to mitigate risks associated with premature starts to 
construction. The PSIA, similar to a compass, will let you know if your project is headed 
in the right direction. The PSIA alone, however, will not prevent a premature start, but it 
can alert project teams to understand the risks of a premature start and to utilize other CII 
best practices and tools such as: 
 Project Definition Rating Index (Gibson and Dumont 1995); 
 Late Deliverables Risk Catalog (Barry et al. 2015); 
 Flash Track Tool (Austin, de la Garza, Pishdad-Bozorgi 2015); 
 Alignment (Griffith and Gibson 1997); 
 Constructability (O’Connor and Tatum 1986); and  
 Project Risk Assessment (Walewski, Gibson, and Dudley 2003). 
In summary, premature starts to construction can be driven my many influencing 
factors and cause a variety of negative impacts. Through case study research and review 
of literature, these drivers have shown to have leading indicators that can be identified 
prior to mobilization and prevent construction interruptions. These drivers, leading 
indicators, and impacts are well known within the construction industry, as shown 
through survey data, but the connection to premature starts had yet to be established prior 
to this research. This research provides a list of leading indicators that can alert project 
teams that mobilization of the construction phase may be premature; thereby causing a 
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multitude of impacts that will affect cost and schedule. It is the hope of RT 323 that the 
overall research findings of this project will facilitate a meaningful discussion of 
premature starts to construction and provide industry professional’s insight to the key 
drivers and impacts of premature starts. 
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Appendix B: Pilot Case Study Questionnaire 
PILOT-CASE STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE  
1. Project Description: Please include scope, phase, cost, scale of project, 





e. Contract Type:___________________________ 
2. What year was the project completed or, if still under construction, what 































8. Was FEED or any stage gate process done before start of construction? 
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Appendix C: In-Depth Case Study Questionnaire 
The Construction Industry Institute Research Team 323 is currently studying what are the 
drivers of a premature construction phase and what happens as a result.  Once drivers 
have been determined this research will identify any indicators of those drivers and how 
might they signal a premature start. 
 
All information gathered from this questionnaire will be for RT 323 only. Any 
information or summaries shared with the public in the final report will not contain any 
identifiable information about the project. 
 
 
Name (optional) & Position/Title:  
  
 
Overall Project Status (please select the best choice from the list below):  
☐ Less than 10% complete 
☐ More than 10% complete but less than 50% complete 
☐ More than 50% complete but less than 90% complete 
☐ Complete 
General Project Questions 
1. To what subsector (within the industrial sector) does this project belong? (e.g. oil & 
gas, power, manufacturing, etc.) 
 
 
2. What is the type of project site? (select one) 
☐ Greenfield 
☐ Brownfield 
☐ Other, please specify:  
 
 
3. How would you classify your project? 
☐ Heavy Industrial 
☐ Light Industrial 
☐ Building 





4. What is the project delivery type? (select one) 
☐ EPC (i.e. engineer-procure-construct) or Design/Build 
☐ Design/Bid/Build 
☐ Construction Management (at risk) 
☐ Owner-Managed 
☐ Other, please specify: 
 
 
5. What is the construction contract type? (select one) 
☐ Lump Sum 
☐ Unit Price 
☐ Cost Reimbursable 




6. What is the original estimated total capital cost of this project and what percent 
complete was the design when this original estimate was prepared? 
a. Total Installed Cost (TIC)/Design Percent Complete: 
 
 




7. What is the original overall duration for this project?   ___ Months 
 
8. What is the original scheduled start and completion date for each applicable element 
of this project?   
 Engineering     ___ _____________ 
 Procurement    ___ ____________ 
 Construction   __________________ 
 
9. What is the actual start and completion date for each applicable element of this 
project?   
 Engineering     ___ _____________ 
 Procurement    ___ ____________ 




10. For this contract what is the scope of supply (check all that apply)? 
☐ Engineering 
☐ Procurement 
☐ Construction (Direct Hire) 
☐ Construction Management 




11. In regards to the project in question, what was the number of recent (within past 5 
years) projects previously completed within this similar business relationship? 
☐ 0 
☐ 1 to 3 
☐ More than 5 
 
Premature Start Driver Questions 
12. What drove the premature start? (select all that apply; example in parentheses) 
☐ Owner mandated overly aggressive schedule 
☐ Owner perceived benefit for early start 
☐ Time to market 
☐ Seasonal/weather constraints  
☐ Regulatory compliance 
☐ Capital availability 
☐ Contractor eager to get started 
☐ Contractor perceived benefit for early start  




   
13. Who set the required completion date for this project? (select one) 
☐ Owner Project Team 
☐ Project Team/Contractor’s Organization 
☐ External Customer 
☐ Government/Compliance 
☐ Owner’s Business Management 




14. Is this project considered a “fast-track” project? (select one) 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
☐ Don’t Know 
 
15. At what percent of design completion was the project mobilized for construction? 
(select one) 
☐ 0-25% 




16. How much time on this project was spent in reactionary mode rather than proactive 






17. What is the basis for design percentage completion in the previous question? 
☐ Validated Earned Value Status report from the engineer 
☐ Third party provided with no substantiation 
☐ Best guess 
☐ Other (please describe): 
 
 
18. Which of the items below best describe team/scope alignment for this project: 
☐ No team building or scope alignment sessions were conducted with any 
project stakeholders throughout the project life cycle 
☐ One team building and/or scope alignment session was conducted but not 
all the project stakeholders were present and no follow up occurred 
☐ Multiple team building and alignment sessions were conducted throughout 
the project life cycle and all project stakeholders were involved in the 
process and follow up actions were noted and acted upon in a timely 
manner 
 
19.  Which item below best describes your best assessment of the overall project team 
experience executing this type of project? 
☐ This team has never worked together before and experience level on 
average is inadequate to meet the demands and complexities of the project 
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☐ This team has several players who have worked together before on a very 
similar project (contract type, scope, schedule and budget) and have 
adequate experience to address the complexities and demands of the 
project 
☐ The majority of the project team have worked together on a previous 
similar successful projects (contract type, scope, schedule and budget) and 
have significant experience to address any complexity or demand the 
project may present 
 
20.     If the project is complete, what is the change in cost and schedule compared to the 
original budget and schedule? (percent and/or actual value) 
☐ Cost:  _ __ ______________ 
☐ Schedule: _ _________________ 
 
21. Was CII’s Project Definition Rating Index (PDRI) or a similar 
sanctioning/authorization tool used to assess the project’s readiness prior to 
project sanction/authorization? 
☐ Yes  
☐ No 
☐ Don’t Know (believe a PDRI was not performed) 
 
22. Were all of the pre-defined deliverables (FEED Study) completed prior to project 
sanction/authorization? 
☐ Yes 
☐ No  
☐ Don’t Know 
 
23. Has this project followed a formal stage gate and/or formal authorization process? 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
☐ Don’t Know 
Premature Start Impact Questions 






25. Which of the following impacts took place as a result of a premature start? (select all 
that apply; examples in parentheses) 
☐ Cost Overruns  
☐ Out of Sequence Work 
☐ Overtime/Unplanned Work  
☐ Schedule Slippage 
☐ Rework 
☐ Poor Productivity 
☐ Scope Not Identified 
☐ Facility Start-up/Production Delay 
☐ Relationship/Reputational Damage 
☐ Poor Morale 
☐ Litigation/Claims 
☐ Safety Exposure 




Leading Indicator Questions 




27. Which of the following best describes a leading indicator of the premature start? 
(select all that apply; examples in parentheses) 
☐ Unrealistic schedule requirements  
☐ Engineering documents not complete (lacked detail) 
☐ Lack of regulatory license/permits 
☐ Unclear project objectives 
☐ Unmitigated assumptions 
☐ Vendor information unavailable prior to design  
☐ Material not available 
☐ Late design deliverables  
☐ Unsupportive management  







Austin, R.; de la Garza, Jesus M.; Pishdad-Bozorgi, P. (2015). Successful Delivery of 
Flash Track Projects. Research Summary 311-1. Austin, TX: Construction 
Industry Institute. 
Austin, R.; de la Garza, Jesus M.; Pishdad-Bozorgi, P.  (2015). Flash Track Tool: User 
Guide. Implementation Resource 311-2. Austin, TX: Construction Industry 
Institute. 
Barry, W.; Leite, F. (2014). The true impact of late deliverables at the construction site. 
Research Summary 300-1. Austin, TX: Construction Industry Institute. 
Aibinu, A. A. (2009). “Avoiding and Mitigating Delay and Disruption Claims Conflict: 
Role of Precontract Negotiation.” In: Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute 
Resolution in Engineering and Construction Volume 1, Issue 1, 47-58 
Barry, W.; Leite, F. (2014). The true impact of late deliverables at the construction site. 
Research Summary 300-1. Austin, TX: Construction Industry Institute. 
Barry, W.; Leite, F. (2015). Late Deliverables to Construction: How Understanding the 
Impacts Can Benefit Dispute Prevention and Resolution. In: ASCE Journal of 
Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction. Volume 7, 
Issue 2. 
Barry, W.; Leite, F.; O'Brien, W.J. (2015). The Late Deliverable Risk Catalog: 
Evaluating the Impacts and Risks of Late Deliverables to Construction Sites. In: 
ASCE Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. Volume 141, Issue 
4. 
Cheng, Y-M. (2013). “An exploration into cost-influencing factors on construction 
Project”. International Journal of Project Management 32, 850-860 
Critchlow, J.; Farr, A.; Briggs, S.; Pickavance, K.; and Lavers, A. 2005. “The great delay 
analysis debate.” In: A paper Presented by the Society of Construction Law in 
Association with the Centre of Construction Law and Management, King’s 
College on 18th October 2005. 
Doloi, H. K. (2011) « Understanding stakeholders’ perspective of cost estimation in 
project management ». International Journal of Project Management 29, 622-636 
Gibson, G.E. Jr. (1997). Pre-Project Planning Tools: PDRI and Alignment. Research 
Summary 113-1. Austin, TX: Construction Industry Institute. 
Gibson, G. E. Jr.; Dumont, P. R. (1995). Project definition rating index (PDRI) for 
industrial projects. Research Report 113-11. Austin, TX: Construction Industry 
Institute. 
 145 
Griffith A.F.; Gibson, G. E. Jr.. (1997). Team Alignment During Pre-Project Planning of 
Capital Facilities. Research Report 113-12. Austin, TX: Construction Industry 
Institute. 
Hwang, B.G.; Zhao, X.; Goh, K.J. (2014). “Investigating the client-related rework in 
building projects; The case of Singapore.” International Journal of Project 
Management 32, 698-708 
Ibbs, W. C., et al. (1994). “Project change management.” Special Publication 43-1, 
Construction Industry Institute, University of Texas, Austin, TX. 
Ibbs, W. C. (2012). “Construction Change: Likelihood, Severity, and Impact on 
Productivity.” In: Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering 
and Construction Volume 4, Issue 3: 67-73 
Knoedler, A. J.; Hellwig, K. A.; Neath, I. (1999). “The Shift from Recency to Primacy 
with Increasing Delay.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition 25, 474-487. 
LaBarre, P. S.; El-adaway, I. H. (2013). “Project Benchmarking: Tool for Mitigating 
Conflicts, Claims, and Disputes through Improved Performance.” In: Journal of 
Legal Affairs an Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction. Volume 6, 
Issue 1. 
Laufer, A. (1991). Construction planning in uncertain environments. National Building 
Research Institute. Technion IIT. Haifa 31-000, Israel 
Li, H.; Chan, N.; Huang, T.; Guo, H. L.; Lu, W.; Skitmore, M. (2009). “Optimization 
construction planning schedules by virtual prototyping enabled resource 
analysis.” Automation in Construction 18, 912–918 
Li, J; Taylor, T. R. B.; Ford, D. N. (2011). Impact of Project Controls on Tipping Point 
Dynamics in Construction Projects. In: Proceedings of the 2011 International 
System Dynamics Conference, Washington, D.C. 
Mahmound-Jouini, S; Midler C.; Garel, G. (2004). “Time-to-market vs. time-to-delivery: 
Managing speed in Engineering, Procurement and Construction.” International 
Journal of Project Management 22, 359-367 
O’Brien, W. J.; Leite, F.; Meeks, S. (2013). Enhanced work packaging: design through 
workface execution. Research Report 272-11. Austin, TX: Construction Industry 
Institute. 
O’Conner, J.T. (1998). Planning for Startup. In: Construction Industry Institute, The 
University of Texas at Austin. 
O’Conner, J.T. (1986). Constructability: A Primer. In: Construction Industry Institute, 
The University of Texas at Austin. 
Research Team 323. (2016) “Finding Leading Indicators to Prevent Premature Starts and 
 146 
Assuring Uninterrupted Construction”. Research Summary 323-1. Construction 
Industry Institute. July, 2016. 
Research Team 323. (2016) “Premature Start Impact Analysis Tool: User Guide and Case 
Studies”. Implementation Resource 323-2, Construction Industry Institute. July, 
2014. 
Rogge, D. F.; Cogliser, C.; Alaman, H.; McCormack, S. (2001). An investigation of field 
rework in industrial construction. Research Report 153-11. Austin, TX: 
Construction Industry Institute. 
Sambasivan, M.; Soon, Y. W. (2007). “Causes and effects of delays in Malaysian 
construction industry.” International Journal of Project Management 25, 517-
526. 
Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business Dynamics: System Thinking and Modeling for A Complex 
World. Irwin McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA, USA 
Sweis, G.; Sweis, R.; Abu Hammad, A; Shboul, A. (2008). “Delays in construction 
projects: The case of Jordan.” International Journal of Project Management 26, 
665-674. 
Vanegas, J. A.; Hastak, M.; Pearce, A. R.; Maldonado, F. (1998). A framework and 
practices for cost-effective engineering in capital projects in the A/E/C industry. 
Research Report 112-11. Austin, TX: Construction Industry Institute. 
Vaus, David de. Research Design in Social Research. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE 
publications Ltd, 2001. Print. 
Walewski, J.; Gibson Jr., G.E.; Dudley, G. (2003). Development of the international 
project risk assessment (IPRA) tool. Research Report 181-11. Austin TX: 
Construction Industry Institute. 
Zidane, Y. J-T.; Johansen, A.; Andersen, B.; Hoseini, E. (2015). “Time-thieves and 
bottlenecks in the Norwegian construction projects.” Procedia Economics and 




Ryan Patrick Griego was born and raised in Albuquerque, New Mexico where he 
attended the University of New Mexico. After earning his B.S. in Civil Engineering 
(2014) he was awarded a scholarship to attend the University of Texas at Austin to 
conduct research and pursue an M.S. in the Construction Engineering and Project 
Management Program. He studied under the guidance of Dr. Fernanda Leite and will 
graduate with a Master of Science in Engineering degree in May 2016. He is an 




Permanent address (or email): ryanpg89@hotmail.com 
This thesis was typed by Ryan Patrick Griego. 
 
 
 
 
